

# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

## **Monterey, California**



## **THESIS**

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
AND ITS PROBLEMS  
- GERMANY AND RUSSIA -**

by

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June 1997

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**- GERMANY AND RUSSIA -**

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
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
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



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## ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to compare civil-military relations and its problems in Germany and Russia and to analyse the following overall question : *What are the Problems and Challenges of Civil-Military Relations in Theory, History, Present Time, and Future ?*

The thesis examines five selected issues of civil-military relations and its problems to analyse the overall question and to substantiate the overall thesis : Theory, German history, the Federal Republic of Germany, Russian history, and the Russian Federation / Russia.

The present Russian government should analyse the German case to find some answers to the problems of democratization and civil-military relations. But Russia must keep in mind the historical context and the specific circumstances of democratization as well as *Innere Führung* in Germany after World War II. The central problem is whether Russia will be able to establish a viable democracy like the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II or will relapse into authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism or even totalitarianism and a passion for empire-building and hegemony, like Nazi Germany after the failure of the Weimar Republic. This is really a problem because contemporary Russia seems more comparable with the Weimar Republic than with the Federal Republic of Germany.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to compare<sup>1</sup> civil-military relations and its problems in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation / Russia and to analyse the following *overall question* :

*What are the Problems and Challenges of Civil-Military Relations in Theory, History, Present Time, and Future ?*

The process of democratization is usually complex and prolonged, and it involves bringing about the end of the non-democratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic system, and then the consolidation of the democratic system.<sup>2</sup>

Democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political concept. Democratization requires open contestation over the right to win control of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs. Using these definitions, it is obvious that there can be liberalization without democratization. ... Essentially, we mean by a consolidated democracy a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become *the only game in town*.<sup>3</sup>

The *main argument of this thesis* is that the process of democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful transition towards democracy. A viable democracy rather depends on a successful consolidation of democracy and a solution to the problems of civil-military relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Concerning the strange debate among political scientists as to whether postcommunist transitions can be usefully compared with other transitions to democracy see, e.g., Nodia, Ghia, "How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 4, October 1996, pp. 15-29.

<sup>2</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 3 and 5.

This study examines *five key issues* in the study of civil-military relations in order to analyse the overall question and to substantiate the overall thesis :

- (1) - theory;
- (2) - German history;
- (3) - Federal Republic of Germany;
- (4) - Russian history;
- (5) - Russian Federation / Russia.

Chapter II, *Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Theory*, gives a theoretical background for the analysis of civil-military relations and presents the problems in the process of democratization focusing on three selected issues : (A.) Civil-Military Relations; (B.) Transition towards Democracy; (C.) Consolidation of Democracy.

In a common sense civil-military relations addresses the relationship of the military to the state.<sup>4</sup> Only military dictatorships have no problem with civil-military relations and civilian control of their armed forces. All other governments, from the most savage of civilian dictatorships to the most participatory of democracies, worry about keeping their armed forces subordinate to the political will. Regardless of the nature of the political culture in which he lives, the modern military officer is oriented toward maximizing his influence in politics and/or policy. In nations with highly institutionalized political systems, the military attempts to exert its influence over the making of national security policy. In nations with poorly institutionalized political structures, the government itself is the prize sought by the military.<sup>5</sup> Civilian control over the armed forces is such an important issue and necessity because the military wields the power to defend society and democracy and so has the power to destroy society and democracy.

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<sup>4</sup> Bracken, Paul, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (editors), U.S. Civil-Military Relations - In Crisis or Transition ? Washington, D.C. : The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 145.

<sup>5</sup> Bernstein, Alvin H., "Civilian Control of the Military in a Democratic Society," Speech - Executive Level Seminar on Democratic Defense Planning and Budgeting, European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GE), 1996, pp. 3-7.

One of the most crucial challenges that democratizing states face is that of redefining civil-military relations and transforming the military into a force loyal to the new democratic systems. In order to prevent the military from becoming a threat, democratizing governments must reeducate their military professionals and instill in them a sense of respect for democratic institutions and the multi-party system. The goal is to limit the military's role in politics and develop a tradition of an apolitical army.<sup>6</sup>

The issue of civil-military relations is very complex, and *civilian control* (Samuel P. Huntington) and / or *civilian supremacy* (Felipe Agüero) is only one important aspect of civil-military relations.<sup>7</sup> Another way to think about civil-military relations in the post-cold war era is as a problem of *organizational design* (Paul Bracken) rather than civilian control because framing the problem as one of designing a military for the future allows a more balanced consideration of more important, although less dramatic, issues than civilian control.<sup>8</sup> A central problem of post-cold war civil-military relations is the extent to which key *subsystems* -- budgetary, industrial base, military, and civilian leadership -- can be realigned for the new environment.

But all in all the present theories of civil-military relations are controversial and do not capture the complexity of civil-military relations. According to one observer of Russian affairs, "The development during the last months of the Soviet Union and the current political development in Russia defy the well-developed theories of civil-military relations."<sup>9</sup>

A post-cold war concept of civil-military relations which is characterized by a permanent process with interdependent relations between state, society, and armed forces must also pay attention to the integration of armed forces into state and society.

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<sup>6</sup> Brusstar, James H. and Jones, Ellen, The Russian Military's Role in Politics, Washington, D.C. : Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 34, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Felipe Agüero's *civilian supremacy* is closely related -- but not identical -- to Samuel P. Huntington's *objective civilian control*. Agüero, Felipe, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy : Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 19-23; and Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 80-85.

<sup>8</sup> Bracken, pp. 145-165.

<sup>9</sup> Tsypkin, Mikhail, "Will the Military Rule Russia ?" Security Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1992, p. 39.

This study defines civil-military relations as a triangle between state, society, and armed forces which balances and guarantees the following three aspects :

- (1) - civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- (2) - civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- (3) - integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.

Perhaps this last aspect is the greatest challenge of civil-military relations in the Russian Federation / Russia today. Especially the ethnic problems seem to be the conditio sine qua non in the process of successful democratization because ethnic problems are related to the problems of *stateness*.<sup>10</sup>

Chapter III, *Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - German History*, underlines the problems of civil-military relations in Prussia / Germany from the beginning of the professionalization of the military in Prussia until the catastrophe of the Third Reich. The history of Germany provides good examples to underline the problems and challenges of civil-military relations. In Germany the patterns of civil-military relations could hardly be more dissimilar. Probably no country has had a wider variety of experiences in civil-military relations than Germany.

No other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism, and the officer corps of no other major power was in the end so completely prostituted. Each chapter of the German story has its lesson and its warnings. The imperial experience shows the benefits of civilian control. The republican period demonstrates the difficulty of achieving that control amidst political chaos. World War I illustrates the disastrous results when military men assume political roles. Nazi rule illustrates the equally catastrophic results when military warnings are unheeded and political leaders ride roughshod over the soldiers. The variety of German civil-military relations makes its history a terrifying but highly instructive study.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Linz and Stepan, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 98.

A very important question in the 1920s was whether Germany would be able to establish a viable democracy or relapse into authoritarianism and a passion for hegemony-building. Since 1919 Germany was a democracy with open elections and a democratic constitution. The transition from the authoritarian Kaiserreich towards the first German democracy was successful. But *Weimar* never was a consolidated democracy. The first German democracy opened the way for the totalitarian Nazi-Germany.

Chapter IV, *Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Federal Republic of Germany*, analyses civil-military relations and its problems in Germany after World War II including the unification of Germany in 1989/90 and focuses on two selected issues : (A.) German Foreign Policy; (B.) the Bundeswehr in State and Society. Since the German rearmament in 1955 *Innere Führung* has made the German Armed Forces an integral and natural component of state order and society in the Federal Republic of Germany. *Innere Führung* or *Inner Leadership* includes *Leadership and Civic Education*. But strictly understood *Innere Führung* -- like other German words that describe a whole complex of philosophical ideas -- has no adequate, concise English translation.

Long the subject of an intense debate, it can be described as military leadership appropriate to the modern world, which enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen. ... *Innere Führung* has been the Federal Republic's ongoing attempt to reconcile the citizen with the soldier, and to overcome the traditional antagonism between democracy and the military in German history.<sup>12</sup>

The concept of *Innere Führung* and the model of the democratic citizen in uniform are hallmarks of the German *Bundeswehr*.<sup>13</sup> It is a very successful concept for the comprehensive integration of armed forces into a democratic state and society -- at least in the German case. Furthermore, right from the very beginning, the Bundeswehr has accomplished a great deal in bringing about the completion of internal German unity since

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<sup>12</sup> Abenheim, Donald, Reforging the Iron Cross : The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 44-45.

<sup>13</sup> German *Bundeswehr* is the name for the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and includes all three services : Army, Air Force, and Navy.

1990.<sup>14</sup> This is why the concept of *Innere Führung* has also become a model for new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, when they consider how to rebuild their armed forces and to solve the problems of civil-military relations in the ongoing process of transition toward and consolidation of democracy.

Chapter V, *Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Russian History*, focuses on some selected issues of civil-military relations and its problems in two periods : (A.) Imperial Russia (1863-1917); (B.) Russia / Soviet Union (1917-1991). Beside Germany the history of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union also provides good examples to underline the problems and challenges of civil-military relations. In history the situation in Russia changed several times. But Russia never was confronted with the consolidation of democracy and its problems. "There is only one thing that Russia has not seen in one thousand years -- freedom."<sup>15</sup>

A military coup in the Soviet Union was unlikely because there was no tradition of successful military coups in Russian / Soviet history. "It is equally established in the Russian / Soviet tradition, however, that whenever the civilian authority is weakened by a succession of crisis or by a revolutionary upheaval, no government can survive without controlling the military or receiving its political support."<sup>16</sup>

In late Imperial Russia civil-military conflict was a reality and a result of the emergence of a professional Russian officer corps. Then, in the Soviet Union, the society was militarized, and civil-military relations were dominated by the party-state system. The dominant party with its bureaucracy controlled the military effectively until the middle of 1990, when the Communist Party was no longer the main political force in the Soviet Union. With the failed *August Coup* of 1991 it became obvious that the Communist Party had lost its power over the military.

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<sup>14</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense (editor), White Paper 1994. White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, Bonn (GE) : Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1994, pp. 15 and 132.

<sup>15</sup> Grossman, Vasily, in Ryszard Kapuscinski, Imperium, New York : Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1994, preface.

<sup>16</sup> Tsyplkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?", pp. 42-43.

The military in Russian and Soviet history never took power for itself. The Russian/Soviet political elites, however, have generally found it impossible to keep or achieve power without active support from the military because of the country's lack of representative institutions, vast ethnic diversity, and sheer size.<sup>17</sup>

Chapter VI, *Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Russian Federation / Russia*, analyses civil-military relations and its problems in the Russian Federation / Russia during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union and focuses on two selected issues : (A.) Russian Foreign and Security Policy; (B.) the Russian Armed Forces in State and Society.

In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, leading to the unification of Germany. The end of the Cold War started the process of a fundamental transformation of the security structure in Europe. It gave rise to hopes that Europe would no longer be divided.

The conventional wisdom holds that the dissolution of the Soviet Union *changed the world*. But the initial hopeful notion ... of unprecedented peace and tranquillity was far too optimistic. ... One of the most important questions in the post-cold war era has been whether Russia will be able to establish a viable democracy or will relapse into authoritarianism and a passion for empire-building.<sup>18</sup>

Since Peter the Great Russia has usually been feared, if not respected, by its neighbors, and whether Russia likes it or not, Russia is, and will remain, a great European power. To bring Russia into a fruitful and cooperative relationship with the rest of the modern world is surely the greatest prize for Russian and Western politicians alike. "To despair, to fall back into the attitudes of the past -- whether those of the Cold War or those of the 19<sup>th</sup> century -- would be a negation of statesmanship."<sup>19</sup>

During the last six years the generals in the Soviet Union / Russia became involved with domestic politics during the course of two violent upheavals. The *August Coup* in 1991 as well as the *October Mutiny* in 1993 failed, and in both cases the military did not

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>18</sup> Leslie Lenkowsky, President of the Hudson Institute, in Odom, William E. and Dujarric, Robert, Commonwealth or Empire ? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, Indianapolis; Indiana : Hudson Institute, 1995, p. XVII.

<sup>19</sup> Braitwaite, Rodic, "Russian Realities and Western Politics," Survival, vol. 3, 1994, p. 24.

assume political power. "The two attempts to seize power espoused similar objectives : to turn back the clock and restore the old USSR system within its former geographic boundaries."<sup>20</sup>

Chapter VII, *Conclusion*, summarizes the main findings of this thesis and explains some implications of these findings.

As mentioned before, the *main argument of this thesis* is that the process of democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful transition towards democracy. A viable democracy rather depends on a successful consolidation of democracy and a solution to the problems of civil-military relations.

In addition, it seems that the tradition in Russian history will continue and the military in Russia will not take power for itself. The danger to democracy in Russia comes not from the threat of military coups, however, but from the possibility that the military may participate in coalitions with pro-communist or radical right political forces wanting to destabilize the status quo or the development of democratic structures.

Furthermore, the present Russian government should analyse the German case to find some answers to the problems of democratization and civil-military relations. But Russia must keep in mind the historical context and the specific circumstances of democratization as well as *Innere Führung* in Germany after World War II. The central problem is whether Russia will be able to establish a viable democracy like the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II or will relapse into authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism or even totalitarianism and a passion for empire-building and hegemony, like Nazi Germany after the failure of the Weimar Republic. This is really a problem because contemporary Russia seems more comparable with the Weimar Republic than with the Federal Republic of Germany.

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<sup>20</sup> Staar, Richard, The New Military in Russia. Ten Myths that Shape the Image, Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 1996, p. 14.

## II. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - THEORY

This chapter gives a theoretical background which is necessary for the analysis of civil-military relations and its problems, and of transition toward and consolidation of democracy. But it can only underline some selected issues because the topic is very complex, controversial, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in a process of development again. Therefore, this chapter focuses on two important theories of civil-military relations as examples : Huntington's concept of *professionalism*, the basic analysis of soldiers and the state after World War II, and Bracken's concept of *organizational design* or *subsystems*, a rethinking of the concept of professionalism in the post-cold war era.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, this chapter defines the terms of transition and consolidation and examines the problems and challenges concerning transition toward and consolidation of democracy.

### A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Civil-military relations theory emerged in the 1950s, and its key concept was Huntington's concept of professionalism.

The military's degree of professionalization and the kind of civilian control exerted on the military were the factors that determined the tension between the state and society and the military. Civilian control either could be based on subordination to an ideology, class, or shared civilian values, or it could be based on professionalism and autonomy within the military sphere. When professionalization was at a high level, and when military issues were strictly separated from civil ones, civilian control would be maximized. In this condition, coups would not take place, and undue military influence on state and society would not be a major problem.

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<sup>21</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957; and Bracken, Paul, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (editors), U.S. Civil-Military Relations - In Crisis or Transition ? Washington, D.C. : The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, pp. 145-165.

because the military would confine itself to its own restricted professional concerns.<sup>22</sup>

### **1. Professionalism**

The fundamental thesis of Huntington's concept of professionalism is that the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man. "The existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives a unique cast to the modern problem of civil-military relations."<sup>23</sup> Huntington defines three distinguishing characteristics of a profession :<sup>24</sup> (1) *Expertise* - Perhaps Harold Lasswell best summed up the special expertise or central skill of military officers as *the management of violence*.<sup>25</sup> (2) *Responsibility* - The motivations of the officer are technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society. The principal responsibility of the military officer is to the state. (3) *Corporateness* - The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually high proportion of his activities.

### **2. Subjective and Objective Civilian Control**

Huntington examines two broad types of civilian control : subjective civilian control which maximizes civilian power, and objective civilian control which maximizes military professionalism. Then he differentiates between two levels of civil-military relations -- power level and ideological level -- and defines several patterns of civil-military relations.

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<sup>22</sup> Bracken, p. 145.

<sup>23</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-18.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

Subjective civilian control is, indeed, the only form of civilian control possible in the absence of a professional officer corps. In its various historical manifestations, subjective civilian control has been identified with the maximization of the power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms.<sup>26</sup>

The rise of the military profession, however, while making the particular forms of subjective civilian control obsolete, also made possible objective civilian control as a new and more meaningful definition of civilian control. Objective civilian control means maximizing military professionalism. Subjective civilian control exists in a variety of forms. In contrast, objective civilian control exist only in one form -- professionalism.

The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. Subjective civilian control, on the other hand, presupposes this involvement. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere.<sup>27</sup>

Objective civilian control achieves the reduction of military power by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. If civilian control is defined in this objective sense, no conflict exists between it and the goal of military security. In contrast, the subjective definition of civilian control presupposes a conflict between civilian control and the needs of military security. The achievement of objective civilian control has only been possible, of course, since the emergence of the military profession.

The conditions which are likely to maximize military professionalism and objective civilian control depend upon the relation between the two levels of civil-military relations.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

On the power level, the key issue is the power of the officer corps relative to the civilian groups within society. On the ideological level, the key issue is the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society.<sup>28</sup>

Huntington compares four ideologies with the military ethic : liberalism, fascism, Marxism, and conservatism.<sup>29</sup> In a society dominated by an antimilitary ideology (liberalism, fascism, or Marxism), military professionalism and civilian control are maximized by the military's renouncing authority and influence and leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from the general life of society. By contrast, in a society dominated by an ideology favorable to the military viewpoint, military power may be increased to a much greater extent without becoming incompatible with a high level of professionalism. Then he explains eight ideal and extreme types of civil-military relations concerning the general relations among ideology, power, and professionalism. He underlines that in actual practice the civil-military relations of any society combines elements of two or more.<sup>30</sup>

But his types are not very useful in the analysis of civil-military relations and its problems and / or in the comparison of states. First, the types are too ideal and extreme. They also do not include the very important ideology of nationalism as well as a differentiation between authoritarian and totalitarian systems.

Second, the analysis of Prussia / Germany is only right concerning Nazi Germany during World War II -- (5) antimilitary ideology, low military political power, low military professionalism, and Prussia / Germany during the Bismarckian-Moltkean epoch (1860 -

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 90-94.

<sup>30</sup> Huntington says that (1) antimilitary ideology, high military political power, high military professionalism is impossible given the theoretical premises stated above, and (2) promilitary ideology, low military political power, low military professionalism as well as (3) promilitary ideology, high military political power, low military professionalism are unlikely to occur except in the most unusual circumstances.

Furthermore, two types presuppose low professionalism and subjective civilian control, and three types permit a high degree of professionalism and objective civilian control : (4) antimilitary ideology, high military political power, low military professionalism; (5) antimilitary ideology, low military political power, low military professionalism; (6) antimilitary ideology, low military political power, high military professionalism; (7) promilitary ideology, high military political power, high military professionalism; (8) promilitary ideology, low military political power, high military professionalism.

1890) -- (7) promilitary ideology, high military political power, high military professionalism.

Third, his analysis of Germany during World War I -- (5) antimilitary ideology, high military political power, low military professionalism -- is questionable. It seems more likely that Imperial Germany in the era of emperor Wilhelm II was characterized by a promilitary ideology, e.g., the naval construction programme (Admiral Tirpitz's *Flottenpolitik*).

Fourth, Huntington argues that one type -- (3) antimilitary ideology, high military political power, low military professionalism -- is unlikely to occur except in the most unusual circumstances. But the Weimar Republic from 1918 - 1926 (German Reichswehr as a state within a state with an important influence inside the first German democracy) as well as the Weimar Republic from 1926 - 1933 (German Reichswehr as faction among factions inside the first German democracy) are important examples for this type.

### **3. Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations**

Bracken argues that it is necessary to reconsider the concept of professionalism to solve the problems of civil-military relations in the post-cold war era because the situation has changed dramatically :

... looking at civil-military problems with these outmoded frameworks produces a repetition of old problems regardless of their relevance to the post-cold war world. ... There has been little interest in the enormous variety of civil-military relationship and their contextual dependency, nor in the extraordinary complexity of modern military forces. In addition, some of the most important and interesting aspects of civil-military relations are neglected because they cannot be discussed in the terminology of professionalization.<sup>31</sup>

He underlines that boundaries between civilians and the military could not be drawn in advance because civilian leaders and the military need to work together. In modern societies the greatly enlarged civilian and military staffs must work together to

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<sup>31</sup> Bracken., pp. 145-146.

solve the problems of security (externally) and civil-military relations (internally) -- problems that were neither strictly *civil* nor strictly *military*.

The very division of the problem into two broad parts -- civil and military -- created a *tension* that was an artifact of the construct. It suggested a search for a dividing line to sort problems into one of two arenas, civil or military. This is not what happened.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, Western theories of communist civil-military relations fare so badly because absent from most accounts of Soviet civil-military relations was its organization. Twice in this century, the Russian officer corps watched the disintegration of the Russian state without taking any action until it was too late to matter. The Russian military behaved like a bureaucracy, with its penchant for inertia and delay. "In looking back on civil-military relations frameworks it is striking how a fixation on typologies missed the most ubiquitous organizational type in the modern world, the bureaucracy."<sup>33</sup>

One way to analyse civil-military relations is to view them as being made up of large subsystems. Bracken analyses four subsystems as the most critical civil-military subsystems :

- (1) budgetary;
- (2) the industrial base and its tie to the military;
- (3) the uniformed military itself, both officer and enlisted;
- (4) the civilian leadership.<sup>34</sup>

He argues that the post-cold war era is especially problematic because the old balances among these four subsystems were defined for a competition and an international environment that no longer exist.

A central problem of post-cold war civil-military relations is the extent to which these subsystems can be realigned for the new environment. Extreme misalignment among them could reflect a disintegration of the

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 152.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 153-154.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

coordinating mechanisms that control military-state relationship. ... the key to successful civil-military relations is to achieve a basic alignment among these key subsystems.<sup>35</sup>

Bracken argues that the study of civil-military relations today is badly in need of new theoretical thinking, as it was in the 1950s. The frameworks developed then helped illuminate some important issues, and they provided a vocabulary that allowed sophisticated discussion of key problems in the field. What is needed to do ?

First, the emphasis that different problems receive has to change with the changing contexts. Second, a more organizationally grounded set of concepts that emphasize the relationship among things like mission, technology, task structure, and organizational structure would be a very useful advance beyond the overused, and misused, concept of professionalization. Finally, a more expansive interpretation of the field would open up new areas of great importance to analytical investigation.<sup>36</sup>

His analysis is a step forward in the theory of civil-military relations in the post-cold war era. But Bracken also fails to analyse the problems and challenges concerning the integration of armed forces and soldiers into state and society. In Russia this means first of all to solve social and ethnic problems inside both the society as well as the armed forces.

Democracy is a form of governance of a state. Thus no modern polity can become democratically unless it is first a state. Therefore, the inexistence of a state or such an intense lack of identification with the state that large groups of individuals in the territory want to join a different state or create an independent state raises fundamental and often unsolvable problems. ... *stateness* problems are so basic, and so underanalyzed ... , however, ... without the existence of a state, there cannot be a consolidated modern democratic regime.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., pp. 164-165.

<sup>37</sup> Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 7.

Stateness is the prerequisite for democracy, and the successful solution of ethnic problems is the prerequisite for stateness in the long run; therefore, the successful solution of ethnic problems is the *conditio sine qua non* for democracy.<sup>38</sup> This underlines the serious lack of theory in general because the soldier's responsibility towards the state, society and democracy depends not least on the identification of the soldier with the state, society, and democracy. Without this identification the soldier never will become a *Protector of Democracy* in his country.

## B. TRANSITION TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

In this century Germany -- in comparison to Russia -- has made experiences with transition towards democracy in three cases : Weimar Republic in 1918 / 1919, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949, and German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989 / 1990.

"Transition in regime type implies movement from something toward something else."<sup>39</sup> Successful transition means the swift movement from one non-democratic political system toward democracy. "In any case, the transition is over when *abnormality* is no longer the central feature of political life ..." <sup>40</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter define the first open elections as the end of transition. This definition is a minimalist one. By contrast, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan use a more complex definition.

A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate

<sup>38</sup> Concerning the importance of ethnic issues and problems see, e.g. : Enloe, Cynthia H., Ethnic Soldiers, State Security in Divided Societies, Athens : The University of Georgia Press, 1980; Karklins, Rasma, Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy. The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia, Washington D.C., The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994; Laba, Roman, "How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism Brought Down an Empire," Transition, vol. 2, no. 1, 12 January 1996, pp. 5-13.

<sup>39</sup> O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C., Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, Fourth Impression, 1993, p. 65.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.<sup>41</sup>

Huntington analyses three different types of transition to democracy :

- (1) transformation;
- (2) replacement;
- (3) transplacement.<sup>42</sup>

## 1. Transformation

This type of transition occurs when the elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy. The transformation requires the government to be stronger than the opposition. Consequently, transformations occur in well-established military regimes where governments clearly control the ultimate means of coercion as well as authoritarian systems which are successful economically. The prototypical cases of transformation are Spain, Brazil, and Hungary.

The **Soviet Union** was neither a military regime nor successful economically. But the Soviet Union / Russia is also an important case of *transformation* because of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of GLASNOST and PERESTROIKA from 1985 to 1991.

## 2. Replacement

Replacements occur when opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. Reformers within the regime are weak or non-existent. The dominant elements in government are standpatters staunchly opposed to the regime. Democratization consequently results from the opposition gaining strength. The former opposition groups then come to power and the

<sup>41</sup> Linz and Stepan, p. 3.

<sup>42</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and London : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, Chapter 3.

conflict then often enters a new phase as groups in the new government struggle among themselves over the nature of the regime they should institute. Only six replacements had occurred by 1990 : Argentina, Greece, Portugal, the Philippines, Romania, and the **German Democratic Republic (GDR)**.

### **3. Transplacement**

Transplacements occur when democratization results largely from joint action by government and opposition groups. In this third type of transition the balance between standpatters and reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime but is unwilling to initiate a change of regime. It has to be pushed and/or pulled into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition. The democratic moderators are strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government. Eleven of thirty-five liberalizations and democratizations that occurred or began in the 1970s and 1980s approximated this model of transition. The most notable ones were in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, and Korea; the regime changes in Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua also involved significant elements of transplacement.

Concerning the first German democracy in 1918 / 1919 -- **Weimar Republic** -- it is very difficult to identify the type of transition toward democracy. An analysis of the Weimar Republic later on will underline that the transition was a result of at least two types of transition, replacement (November Revolution in Germany in 1918) and intervention (the threat of an allied occupation of Germany at the end of World War I). After World War II in West Germany -- since 1949 **Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)** -- the prerequisite for transition towards democracy came from outside by intervention. "Virtually the only path in which totalitarianism defeated in war could lead rapidly to a democratic regime is by occupation by a democratic regime and externally monitored democratic installation."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Linz and Stepan, p. 57.

## C. CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

Linz and Stepan define a consolidated democracy as a political situation in which democracy has become behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally *the only game in town*.<sup>44</sup>

- Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.
- Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
- Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.<sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argue that democracy is a form of governance of a state and that the problem of *stateness* is underanalysed. This is an important gap in theory because without the existence of a state, there cannot be a consolidated modern democratic system.

If a functioning state exists, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated.<sup>46</sup> The conditions must exist for a development of a free and lively civil society. Furthermore, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society; a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life; a state

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government, and an institutionalized economic society.

By contrast, Huntington explains that countries of the third wave of democratization (1974 until today) have three types of problems in developing and consolidating their new democracies :

- (1) transition problems;
- (2) contextual problems;
- (3) systemic problems.<sup>47</sup>

His analysis also gives a very useful background to analyse the unsuccessful consolidation of democracy in the Weimar Republic (1918 - 1933).

### **1. Transition Problems**

Transition problems stem directly from the phenomenon of regime change from authoritarianism to democracy. "They included the problems of establishing new constitutional and electoral systems, weeding out proauthoritarian officials and replacing them with democratic ones, repealing or modifying laws that were unsuitable for democracy, abolishing or drastically changing authoritarian agencies such as the secret police, and, in former one-party systems, separating party and government property, functions, and personnel."<sup>48</sup> Huntington underlines two key transition problems. First, how to treat authoritarian officials who had blatantly violated human rights -- the torturer problem. Second, how to reduce military involvement in politics and establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations -- the praetorian problem. New democratic regimes have to decide what to do with the symbols, doctrines, organizations, laws, civil servants, and leaders of the authoritarian system. "How should the democratic government respond to charges of gross violations of human rights--murder, kidnapping, torture, rape, imprisonment without trial--committed by the officials of the authoritarian regimes ?"<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 209-210.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 211.

This decision concerns the torturer problem : to prosecute and punish versus to forgive and forget. "In Eastern Europe, apart from Romania and East Germany, the initial overall tendency was to forgive and forget."<sup>50</sup>

The torturer problem overlaps with an politically more serious problem confronting many new democracies : the need to curb the political power of the military establishment and to make the armed forces into a professional body committed to providing for the external security of the country. This key-problem of civil-military relations concerns five aspects of armed forces in democracies : professionalism, mission, leadership and organization, size and equipment, and status.<sup>51</sup>

## **2. Contextual Problems**

This second category of problems stems from the nature of the society, its economy, culture, and history, and were in some degree endemic to the country, whatever its form of government. The authoritarian rulers did not resolve these problems and, in all probability, neither would the democratic rulers. "In fact, however, apart from a low level of economic development, the number and severity of a country's contextual problems appeared to be only modestly related to its success or failure in consolidating democracy."<sup>52</sup> Third wave democracies have eight major contextual problems : major insurgencies, ethnic/communal conflicts (apart from insurgencies), extreme poverty (low per capita GNP), severe socio-economic inequality, chronic inflation, substantial external debt, terrorism (apart from insurgency), and extensive state involvement in the economy.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 228.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 243-251.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 253-254.

### **3. Systemic Problems**

This third category of problems stems from the working of a democratic system. Authoritarian political systems suffer from problems that derive from their particular nature, such as overly concentrated decision making, deficient feedback, dependence on performance legitimacy. Other problems tend to be peculiarly characteristic of democratic systems : stalemate, the inability to reach decisions, susceptibility to demagoguery, domination by vested economic interests. These problems have afflicted long-standing democracies, and new third wave democracies presumably would not be immune to them.<sup>54</sup>

*To recapitulate*, this chapter focused on some selected issues of theory to get an understanding about civil-military relations and its problems in the process of democratization. It is important to keep in mind two main aspects from these theoretical perspectives before analyzing the cases of Germany and Russia.

(1) The theories of civil-military relations fail to analyse the problems and challenges concerning the integration of armed forces and soldiers into state and society. Future theories should define and analyse civil-military relations as a triangle between state, society, and armed forces which balances and guarantees the following three aspects:

- civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.

(2) The process of democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful transition towards democracy. A viable democracy rather depends on a successful consolidation of democracy and a solution to the problems of civil-military relations. Especially the analysis of German history will underline this important aspect.

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

### **III. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - GERMAN HISTORY**

Another prerequisite to get an understanding of civil-military relations and the concept of *Innere Führung* in present Germany -- besides the theoretical background given in chapter II -- is knowledge of Prussian / German militarism and civil-military relations in German history; therefore, this chapter gives an historical overview of civil-military relations and its problems in German history. It underlines problems of civil-military relations and the influence of the military in Germany from the beginning of professionalization until the catastrophe of the Third Reich.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, it explains some reasons and experiences concerning successful transition toward and unsuccessful consolidation of democracy in the Weimar Republic (1918-1933).

#### **A. PRUSSIA**

The profession of officership was essentially a product of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and one of the most significant institutional creations of that century. This emergence of a professional officer corps created the modern problem of civil-military relations in Europe and North America because of the fundamental transformation in the first part of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. "To Prussia goes the distinction of originating the professional officer."<sup>56</sup> The great Prussian reforms mark the beginning of military professionalism in the West. Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau, not Frederick the Great and his father, were the true founders of the modern Prussian / German Army.

<sup>55</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 19-58 and 98-124 gives a very good summary; see also, e.g.: Kitchen, Martin, The German Officer Corps 1890-1914, London : Oxford University Press, 1968; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (editor), Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648-1939, München (GE) : Bernhard und Graefe Verlag, 1983; Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (editor), The Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany in the Twentieth Century, Oxford and Washington, D.C., Berg Publishers Limited, 1995; Neugebauer, Karl-Volker (editor), Grundzüge der deutschen Militärgeschichte, Band 1 - Historischer Überblick, Band 2 - Arbeits- und Quellenbuch, Freiburg (GE) : Rombach Verlag, 1993.

<sup>56</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 31.

The disastrous defeat of the old army in 1806 meant that a drastic reform of its structure and organization could no longer be postponed, and even the arch-conservatives realized that Prussia could not be saved from her humiliating situation without fundamental changes in the military system. In Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen and Grolman, Prussia had statesmen and soldiers who were admirably equipped to instigate such reforms, inspired by a vision that went far beyond the purely military problem of freeing Prussia from French domination. The reform realized that the central problem was political rather than military.<sup>57</sup>

In addition, it was a Prussian, Carl von Clausewitz, who contributed in *On War* the theoretical rationale for the new profession and the first theoretical justification of civilian control.<sup>58</sup>

### 1. Prussian Military Professionalism, 1808-1870

Perhaps the birth of the military profession occurred on 6 August 1808. On that day the Prussian government issued its decree on the appointment of officers which set forth the basic standard of professionalism with uncompromising clarity :

*The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts. All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal duties and equal rights.*<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Kitchen, p. xiv.

<sup>58</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von, *On war*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1984.

<sup>59</sup> "Reglement über die Besetzung der Stellen der Portepee-Fähnriche, und über die Wahl zum Offizier bei der Infanterie, Kavallerie und Artillerie, 6 August 1808," published in Prussian General Staff, *Die Reorganisation der Preußischen Armee nach dem Tilsiter Frieden*, vol. II, sec. 3, Berlin, 1857, 366-369, quoted by Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 30-31 and 472-473.

While all the nations of Europe by 1875 had acquired the basic elements of military professionalism, in Prussia alone were these elements developed into a complete system. The elements of the Prussian system were as follows : (1) requirements of general and special educations; (2) examinations and institutions for higher military education, (3) an elaborate and efficient staff system; (4) a sense of corporate unity and responsibility; (5) a recognition of the limits of professional competence.<sup>60</sup>

The answer why Prussia took the lead in such a manner is to be found in the general causes responsible for the emergence of professionalism in Europe and in the peculiar extent to which they were present in Prussia. There were four main factors :<sup>61</sup>

- (1) technological specialization;
- (2) competitive nationalism;
- (3) conflict between democracy and aristocracy;
- (4) presence of stable legitimate authority over the military forces.

The rise of nationalism and democracy had one important product which was closely linked to the emergence of professionalism. This was the concept of the *nation in arms* and its corollary of a national army. Prussia, the first country to professionalize her officer corps, was also the first to introduce permanent universal service on 3 September 1814. In the reversal of roles which took place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the enlisted men became a cross section of the national population and the officers became a separate professional group living in a world of their own with few ties to outside society.

The evolution of professional methods of entry went through three phases :<sup>62</sup>

- (1) the elimination of aristocratic prerequisites for entry;
- (2) the requirement of a basic level of professional training and competence;
- (3) the requirement of a minimum general education and the provision of this education in institutions not operated by the military.

The establishment of professional standards for entry into the officer corps was followed by the establishment of professional standard for advancement within the corps.

<sup>60</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 31.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 32-36.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

In general, the new advancement system took the form of promotion by seniority tempered by selection. In Prussia, for example, Scharnhorst introduced the idea of examination as a prerequisite to promotion and raised the pay of officers so as to decrease their reliance upon outside income. Able officers were advanced rapidly in the General Staff.

As the science of war increased in scope and complexity, institutions for its advanced study became increasingly necessary. Prussia recognized this long before any other power, and in 1810 Scharnhorst established the famous Kriegsakademie in Berlin. This war academy was the focal institution of Prussian professionalism.

The primacy of Prussia was most obvious in the development of a professional staff. The Prussian general staff dates from 25 November 1803. But it never had the opportunity to function effectively prior to the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon. In 1808 Scharnhorst reorganized the staff, and throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century the General Staff tended to be the organizational stronghold of Prussian professionalism. Under the leadership of Helmuth Count von Moltke, who became its chief in 1857, the General Staff rapidly acquired preeminence.

Moltke became the dominant ideal of the German officer corps. From the 1860's on, service in the General Staff was the most coveted duty in the German Army. The wine-red trouser stripe of the General Staff officer became the symbol of a new elite within the officer corps, the *cream of the profession*, signifying the highest standards of knowledge, competence, and devotion to duty. Moltke's famous injunction to his General Staff officers was as follows :

*Always be more than you seem!*<sup>63</sup>

Probably the most revolutionary aspect of the Prussian system was its assumption that genius was superfluous, and even dangerous, and that reliance must be placed upon average men succeeding by superior education, organization, and experience. This was the antithesis of the 18<sup>th</sup> century theory of the military genius.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

## 2. Clausewitz's *On War*

The new conditions required a new theory which received its first comprehensive and explicit formulation in *On War*<sup>64</sup> by Clausewitz, published posthumously in 1831. Clausewitz had been an assistant to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the work of military reform, and he wrote his book during his tour as director of the War Academy in the years after 1815. "In formulating the first theoretical rationale for the military profession, Clausewitz also contributed the first theoretical justification of civilian control."<sup>65</sup>

Clausewitz's views on tactics and principles of strategy, however, are not the most important aspects of *On War*. "His significant contribution occurs at a higher level of analysis and concerns the inherent nature of war and the relation of war to other forms of human activity."<sup>66</sup> Clausewitz's theory concerning the nature of war is the most important aspect concerning civil-military relations.

The basic element in Clausewitz's theory is his concept of the dual nature of war. War is at one and the same time an autonomous science with its own method and goals and yet a subordinate science in that its own ultimate purposes come from outside itself. This concept of war is a true professional one ...<sup>67</sup>

Furthermore, Clausewitz expresses many other and secondary elements of the professional military ethic. But his seminal contribution is his concept of the dual nature of war and the role of the soldier. Given this, virtually all the other aspects of professionalism must necessarily follow.

For Clausewitz the essence of war when considered as an independent science, as a thing in itself *Krieg an sich*, is force. "War is thus an act of force to compel our adversary

<sup>64</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*; see also : Clausewitz, Carl von, Vom Kriege, Bonn (GE) : Dümmler Verlag, 19. Auflage 1990; Paret, Peter, Clausewitz und der Staat, Bonn (GE) : Dümmler Verlag, 1993; Rothfels, Hans, Carl von Clausewitz - Politik und Krieg, Reprint of the First Edition from 1920, Bonn (GE) : Dümmler Verlag, 1980.

<sup>65</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 58.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 55-56.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

to do our will."<sup>68</sup> War in this sense permits of no limitation because "...to overcome the enemy, or disarm him -- call it what you will -- must always be the aim of warfare."<sup>69</sup>

Liddell Hart refers to Clausewitz as "*The Mahdi of mass and mutual massacre* and the *source of the doctrine of 'absolute war,' the fight to the finish theory.*"<sup>70</sup> In Huntington's view this is a misinterpretation of Clausewitz -- and Huntington is right.

Only when considered abstractly, in theory, independent of all else, war is violence without limit. In practice, war is never an isolated act. Force is not an end in itself. It is only justified when it is rationally employed for public purpose. War is always subordinate to the external political ends which determine the extent and nature of the violence to be employed. The results of war are never absolute.<sup>71</sup>

For Clausewitz there was no doubt about it that the soldier must always be subordinate to the statesman (*Primat der Politik*).

War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. ... The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.<sup>72</sup>

## B. IMPERIAL GERMANY

Germany inherited from Prussia the most professional officer corps in Europe. Its central elements were the General Staff and the Kriegsakademie. German institutional professionalism had its counterpart in the dominance of the professional ethic in the German military mind. The two outstanding military leaders of Germany -- Helmuth Count von Moltke who was Chief of Staff from 1857-1888 and Alfred von Schlieffen who

<sup>68</sup> Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>70</sup> Quoted by Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 57.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>72</sup> Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.

occupied the same post from 1891 to 1905 -- were both disciples of Clausewitz. It was accepted gospel in the officer corps that war was an instrument of politics and therefore the soldier was the junior partner of the statesman.<sup>73</sup>

The First World War saw the complete destruction of the imperial balance in civil-military relations. By the end of the war the General Staff was running the German government. "Battle transforms generals into heroes; the heroes transform themselves into politicians; and the result is a loss of professional military restraint and caution."<sup>74</sup>

### 1. Imperial Balance, 1870-1914

Moltke was more politically aware than Schlieffen but he had no political ambitions and restricted himself to vigorous presentation of the military viewpoint. His guiding ideal was that of an unpolitical army.

*The commander in his operations ... has to keep military victory as the goal before his eyes. But what statemanship does with his victories or defeats is not his province. It is that of the statesman.*<sup>75</sup>

Even more than Moltke, Schlieffen avoided politics and devoted himself and the General Staff to strictly military matters. He was the military technician par excellence, and he created the *Schlieffen-Plan*. That strategy was designed to cope with what the military viewed as the nightmare situation of a two-front war which would require a quick and

<sup>73</sup> See, e.g. : Zechlin, Egmont, Die Reichsgründung, Walther Hubatsch (editor), Deutsche Geschichte. Ereignisse und Probleme, Band 3, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin und Wien : Ullstein, 2. ergänzte Auflage 1974; Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Joachim Leuschner (editor), Deutsche Geschichte, Band 9, Göttingen (GE) : Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1973; Baumgart, Winfried, Deutschland im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1890-1914): Grundkräfte, Thesen und Strukturen, Walther Hubatsch (editor), Deutsche Geschichte. Ereignisse und Probleme, Band 4, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin und Wien : Ullstein, 1972; Mommsen, Wolfgang J.(editor), Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, Fischer Weltgeschichte, Band 28, Frankfurt am Main (GE) : Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 6. Auflage 1976; Herzfeld, Hans, Der Erste Weltkrieg, Martin Broszat und Helmut Heiber (editors), dtv-Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Band 1, München (GE) : Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 4. Auflage 1976; Joll, James, The Origins of the First World War, London and New York : Longman, 1992; Robbins, Keith, The First World War, Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press, 1993.

<sup>74</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 106.

<sup>75</sup> Quoted by ibid., p. 100.

decisive victory on one front. As the General Staff declared in a confidential statement of 1902,

*We want to conquer nothing, we merely want to defend what we own. We shall probably never be attackers but rather always be the attacked. The necessary quick success can be brought us with certainty only by the offensive.*<sup>76</sup>

The German military indeed manifested an almost pathological concern for national security. Far from advocating war, the military leaders generally viewed it as the last resort of policy and looked forward to it with gloomy forebodings and feverish preparations.

## **2. Military Dictatorship, 1914-1918**

The involvement of the General Staff in politics began during Erich von Falkenhayn's tenure as its chief from the fall of 1914 to August 1916 (the defeat at Verdun). This was, however, merely a prelude to the virtually absolute power which Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff exercised in the last two years of the war when the former replaced Falkenhayn and the latter became First Quartermaster General. The fundamental element in this tremendous expansion of military control was the unprecedented popularity of the victor of Tannenberg with the German people. Hindenburg was a national idol whom the Germans trusted implicitly to bring them success.<sup>77</sup>

In 1918 Hindenburg and Ludendorff were able to secure the dismissal of the chief of the Emperor's Civil Cabinet. The other military officers were similarly subordinated to the will of the General Staff.

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<sup>76</sup> Quoted by *ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

## C. WEIMAR REPUBLIC

In the Weimar Republic<sup>78</sup> (1918-1933) the overall process of democratization was very complex and prolonged. By using O'Donnell's and Schmitter's definition the transition from Imperial Germany toward the first German democracy *Weimar* was successful. There were open elections in *Weimar* and a democratic constitution. But *Weimar* never was a consolidated democracy.

It is difficult to identify the type of transition toward democracy in *Weimar* because of four main problems at the end of the First World War. First, the Great War was definitely lost. Second, the German military still had a strong position in the government, and the defeated German Armed Forces got a warm welcome from the population. Third, the outbreak of the November Revolution in 1918 and the involvement of the Armed Forces. Fourth, the threat of an allied invasion. Therefore, the transition in *Weimar* was a result of two types -- replacement and intervention. The military permitted or at least tolerated the transition towards democracy. The military leaders, first of all Hindenburg (later President from 1925-1934) and the General Staff linked the responsibility of the lost Great War with liberal and democratic forces in Germany (the "stab-in-the-back" myth - *Dolchstoßlegende*). This was a tremendous burden for all democratic forces during the entire Weimar Republic.

Furthermore, during the Weimar Republic all three problems of consolidation of democracy -- transition problems, contextual problems, and systemic problems -- were not solved. There were two key transition problems that Weimar never solved. First, the responsibility for World War I (*Kriegsschuldfrage*) and especially the responsibility of the German military leaders. Second, the need to reduce the military involvement in politics and establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations. Germany was beaten but not destroyed in 1918-1919. The military leaders linked the responsibility of the Great War with international circumstances, first of all with the German faith to the treaty with

<sup>78</sup> See, e.g. : Herzfeld, Hans, Die Weimarer Republik, Walther Hubatsch (editor), Deutsche Geschichte. Ereignisse und Probleme, Band 6, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin und Wien : Ullstein, 4. Auflage 1975; Heiber, Helmut, Die Republik von Weimar, Martin Broszat und Helmut Heiber (editors), dtv-Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, München (GE) : Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 9. Auflage 1976; Bessel, Richard, Germany after the First World War, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1993.

Austria-Hungary and the great, successful fight against Russian despotism. Furthermore, the military leaders linked the responsibility of the defeat in the West with the liberal and democratic forces in Germany. Because of both the German military was able to hold a special position during Weimar.

Also the Weimar Republic was confronted with several of the eight major contextual problems confronting democracies during their consolidation : major insurgencies, ethnic/communal conflicts (apart from insurgencies), extreme poverty (low per capita GNP), severe socio-economic inequality, chronic inflation, substantial external debt, terrorism (apart from insurgency), and extensive state involvement in the economy. For example, the Weimar Republic was confronted with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919; several assaults against political leaders of Weimar from the extreme left side as well as from the extreme right side during the first years of Weimar - the death of *Rathenau* in 1922; the *Kapp-Putsch* in 1920; unrest of the extreme left forces especially between 1919 and 1923 - *Ruhrkämpfe*; paramilitary groups outside the regular armed forces during the entire Weimar era; inflation - occupation of the Ruhr/Rhineland - general strike in 1923; the trial of the extreme right forces who had attempted to overthrow the government in 1923 - *Hitler-Putsch*; the Great Depression in 1929; and the elections in 1930 - *NSDAP* = 18.6% of the *Reichstag*.

Furthermore, the Weimar Republic never solved the systemic problems either in the government or in the public opinion. There were too many parties, sometimes over thirty, and these parties were in the spectrum from the extreme left to the extreme right; therefore, it was very difficult for the democratic forces to reach necessary majorities.

Last but not least, the constitution of the Weimar Republic included the famous Art. 48 (emergency-decree power of the President). Especially at the end of the Weimar Republic during 1930 - 1933 the chancellors, supported by Reichspräsident Hindenburg, resorted to Art. 48 of the constitution to carry on governing. The chancellors -- first of all Heinrich Brüning from 1930 to 1932 -- and Hindenburg used Art. 48 to make laws outside the decision-making process of the parliament. President and chancellors bypassed the Weimar Reichstag by using Art. 48 and took the first step that facilitated the rise of Hitler and German dictatorship.

The Weimar Republic practiced two different methods in foreign policy concerning the Treaty of Versailles : the policy of resistance (Ruhr 1923), and the policy of *fulfillment*. In this context the two most important aspects were the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (1923) and the Treaty of Locarno (1925) with Germany's entry into the League of Nations in 1926. The occupation of the Ruhr isolated France, and the Treaty of Locarno as well as the League of Nations opened for Germany the way to the international community.

In January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, without consulting the other Allies. David Lloyd George said many years later : "*If there had been no Rapallo, there would have been no Ruhr.*"<sup>79</sup> The German government ordered passive resistance and paid the coal and steel workers not to work. "Though the policy bankrupted the German government -- and sparked hyperinflation -- it also prevented France from achieving its objective, thereby turning the occupation of the Ruhr into a massive failure."<sup>80</sup> The occupation of the Ruhr ended in the fall of 1923. Inflation raged, threatening the ability of the German government to carry out any of its obligations. France's insistence on full reparations had become unfulfillable as a result of French actions. Furthermore, France and Great Britain had managed to checkmate each other : France, by insisting on weakening Germany by unilateral action and thereby forfeiting British support; Great Britain, by insisting on conciliation without considering its impact on the balance of power, thereby forfeiting French security. "Even a disarmed Germany proved strong enough to thwart unilateral French actions -- an augury of what lay ahead once Germany threw off the shackles of Versailles."<sup>81</sup>

By the end of 1923 Gustav Stresemann became Foreign Minister. His method for renewing Germany's strength was the so called policy of *fulfillment*, which amounted to a total reversal of previous German policy. Stresemann was the first postwar German leader

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<sup>79</sup> Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore : Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 267.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 267.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 268.

who exploited the geopolitical advantages which the Treaty of Versailles conferred with Germany.

He grasped the essentially brittle nature of the Franco-English relationship, and used it to widen the wedge between the two wartime allies. He cleverly exploited the British fear of a German collapse vis-à-vis both France and the Soviet Union.<sup>82</sup>

If fulfillment succeeded, Germany would become progressively stronger and be in a position to threaten the equilibrium of Europe. "*The policy of fulfillment was bound to bring closer the day described by General von Seeckt : We must regain our power, and as soon as we do, we will naturally take back everything we lost.*"<sup>83</sup>

The Locarno Pact (1925) was greeted with exuberant relief as the dawning of a new world order. "But amidst all the jubilation, no one noticed that the statesmen had sidestepped the real issues; Locarno had not so much pacified Europe as it had defined the next battlefield."<sup>84</sup> Locarno in fact marked the beginning of the end of the Versailles international order.

The wartime Allies had all abdicated their responsibilities -- America shirked its role in designing the peace, Great Britain renounced its historic role as balancer, and France relinquished its responsibility as guardian of the Versailles settlement. Only Stresemann, leader of the defeated Germany, had a long-range policy, and he inexorably moved his country to the center of the international stage.<sup>85</sup>

In 1926 Germany entered the League of Nations. Stresemann skillfully used Germany's entry into the League both to increase his options toward the Soviet Union and to intensify German pressure on France for parity in armaments. Within a year of Locarno, in 1926, a treaty of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed in

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 271.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 274.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 276.

Berlin. "Berlin and Moscow were united in hostility to Poland, as German Chancellor Wirth told his Ambassador to Moscow, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau : *One thing I tell you frankly; Poland must be eliminated. ... I do not conclude any treaty which might strengthen Poland.*"<sup>86</sup>

However, unlike his nationalist critics -- and quite contrary to the Nazis -- Stresemann relied on patience, compromise, and the blessing of European consensus to achieve his goals. He saw no need for a violent revision of Versailles. When Stresemann died on 3 October 1929, Germany had no leader of comparable talent. At the time of Stresemann's death, the reparations issue was on the way to being resolved, and Germany's western boarders had been settled. Germany remained revisionist with respect to its eastern boarders and to the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

### **1. State within a State, 1918-1926**

The inauguration of the Weimar Republic saw the role of the military change from complete dominance of the state to essential support for the state. First, in 1918, President Friedrich Ebert in effect negotiated a treaty with the military leaders receiving the support of the army in exchange for the suppression of the extreme left. Second, in 1920, during the Kapp Putsch, the army maintained a wait-and-see neutrality and so underlined again its power inside the state. Third, three years later when the government was menaced by the threat of uprisings from both the extreme right and extreme left, the army command defended republican authority, and exercised emergency power in its behalf.

That the Weimar government existed as long as it did is due to army support. That support, however, was not something which could be commanded by the government; it was something which was granted by the army.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>87</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 106-107.

These examples underline a central problem of the Weimar Republic -- civilian control of the *Reichswehr*.<sup>88</sup> The Weimar Republic never solved this problem. From 1918 to 1926 the *Reichswehr* was state within a state but with an important political influence inside the first German democracy. The officer corps in the Weimar Republic retreated from the ideology of military dictatorship in the direction of the old imperial military ethic.

The dominant figure in the *Reichswehr* from 1919 until 1926 was General Hans von Seeckt. The one weak element in Seeckt's formulation of the military ethic was a certain haziness as to where the ultimate loyalty of the army lay. This reflected the ambiguity of the Weimar constitution and the political weakness of the republican government. Seeckt's description of the place of the army was that the army serves the state; it is above parties.

*The army should become a State within the State, but it should be merged in the State through service, in fact it should itself become the purest image of the State.*<sup>89</sup>

This was fine as far as it went. But it left undefined the relationship of the military to the government. It was a state within a state, not a professional guild serving a government. What this meant in practice was well illustrated during the 1923 crisis when President Ebert asked General Seeckt where the *Reichswehr* stood. "*The Reichswehr, Mr. President*, replied the latter, *stands behind me.*"<sup>90</sup> And there were no general principles which defined where Seeckt stood. At this time he seriously considered assuming sovereign power himself. By refusing to accept the Weimar Republic as the permanent embodiment of the German state, the leaders of the *Reichswehr* were required to make political judgements at any moment of acute crisis. The governments of the Weimar Republic -- often named a democracy without democrats -- were not able to control the

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<sup>88</sup> *Reichswehr* was the name for the German Armed Forces of the *Kaiserreich* as well as of the *Weimar Republic*.

<sup>89</sup> Quoted by Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 111.

<sup>90</sup> Quoted by *ibid.*, p. 112.

*Reichswehr*. The *Reichswehr* did not stand behind democracy but rather behind its own military and conservative interests.

## 2. Faction among Factions, 1926-1933

After Seeckt's retirement, his successor, Colonel General Wilhelm Heye, and other generals such as Wilhelm Groener attempted to carry on his policies. Under Seeckt the army had been called upon to make political decisions only when there was an acute constitutional crisis. In contrast, after his departure the army became more and more involved in the day to day affairs and maneuverings of party politics. "This involvement was brought about not by any change in the structure of authority but simply by the willingness of the military leadership to apply the political power of the army to immediate political ends."<sup>91</sup>

The two key figures in this change were Hindenburg and General Kurt von Schleicher. Hindenburg was elected President of the Republic in 1925. The army now defined loyalty to the state as loyalty to the field marshal and national hero.

Schleicher had been appointed head of the political department of the Defense Ministry in 1926. Trading upon his influence with Hindenburg and negotiating and dealing with party politicians of all stripes, he became a key figure in the government, making and unmaking cabinets with wanton abandon. In 1927, Schleicher eased out the Defense Minister, Otto Gessler, who had appointed him, and had Groener put in this post. Subsequently, in 1930, he brought about the fall of the cabinet of Chancellor Hermann Müller and the replacement of the latter by Heinrich Brüning. Two years later he torpedoed Brüning and Groener and secured the appointment of Franz von Papen as Chancellor. He himself took over the post of Defense Minister. Late in the autumn of 1932, Papen was disposed of, and in December, Schleicher became Chancellor. Generals now occupied the two highest posts in the government. Later Schleicher paid the price of failure in totalitarian politics when he was assassinated in the Nazi purge of 30 June 1934.

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 112.

His enemies soon combined against Schleicher, however, and, at the end of January 1933, Hitler succeeded him at the head of a cabinet of Nazis and nationalists. Under Schleicher the Reichswehr had ceased to be a state within a state and had become a faction among factions. The generals had entered into the competition of politics and they had lost.<sup>92</sup>

#### D. THIRD REICH

In January, 1933, Hitler came to power and demonstrated that the Versailles system had indeed been a house of cards. The following years were characterized by several international crises. In this context the most important aspects were the *appeasement policy* from 1933 until 1939 and the Munich Conference in 1938.<sup>93</sup>

The appeasement policy of the Western powers against Germany in the 1930s was a strategic option with three aims : First, to change Nazi-Germany's behavior. Second, to satisfy Nazi-Germany with marginal gains which did not threaten the western powers' vital interests. Third, to buy time to build up forces, strengthen alliances, and initiate a war from a position of strength. The appeasement policy failed because it was not applied as a coherent strategy. But in comparison to the First World War and the international situation of instability and crises this strategy was understandable. The first priority of the Western powers was to prevent a new Great War.

In contrast, in 1935 Hitler decided to reintroduce general conscription. In 1936 Hitler cancelled the Locarno Pact and ordered the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. In 1937 Hitler revealed his war aims at the *Führerconference (Hoßbach*

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>93</sup> See, e.g. : Broszat, Martin, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, Martin Broszat und Helmut Heiber (editors), dtv-Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Band 9, München (GE) : 6. Auflage 1976; Nolte, Ernst, Der Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin und Wien : Ullstein, 1973; Vogelsang, Thilo, Die nationalsozialistische Zeit. Deutschland 1933 bis 1939, Walther Hubatsch (editor), Deutsche Geschichte. Ereignisse und Probleme, Band 7, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin und Wien : Ullstein, 2. Auflage 1974; Erdmann, Karl Dietrich, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, Herbert Grundmann (editor), Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, Band 21, München (GE) : Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 9. Auflage 1980; Bell, Philip M. H., The Origins Of The Second World War In Europe, London and New York : Longman Group Limited, Eleventh Impression, 1995; Parker, R.A.C., Struggle For Survival. The History Of The Second World War, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1989.

*Memorandum*) -- additional German living-space (*Lebensraum*) was to be obtained by the use of force. In 1938 the world saw the *Anschluß* of Austria.

At the Munich Conference on 29 September 1938, Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier decided that the Sudeten German areas of Czechoslovakia were ceded to Germany. Hitler's position was that the cession of the *Sudetenland* was his final demand.

The intention of the Western powers was to put an end to German expansion. It was the last great trial of the Western powers to stop Nazi-Germany without a new Great War.

It was a terrible problem for the truly conscientious. Should Germany's wrongs be righted, at risk of strengthening Fascism? But if her wrongs were righted, might this not weaken Fascism? If the German people had restored to them the rights and the territories of which they had been deprived by the Versailles Settlement, would not they rejoin the comity of peace-loving powers, and their militarism wither away?<sup>94</sup>

Only three weeks later Hitler decided to liquidate the rump of Czechoslovakia. At 16 March 1939, the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was established. Furthermore, on 23 March 1939, the Memel territory was joined to the German Reich. Simultaneously the German-Polish relations began to deteriorate. On 1 September 1939, Germany attacked Poland.

The transition toward an totalitarian system in Germany began in 1930 and was finished on 30 January 1933 (Hitler's government was sworn in). From 1933 (*Reichstag fire* and *Law for Removing the Distress of People and Reich* -- the *Enabling Act*) until 1934 (*Röhm-Putsch* and death of Hindenburg) Hitler consolidated his totalitarian system and successfully destroyed the opposition. In comparison to the democracy of the Weimar Republic the *Führer* and *Reichskanzler* Hitler and his Nazis were much more successful in consolidating their totalitarian system as well as manipulating and fascinating the Germans including main parts of the German Armed Forces. The result was the second German bid

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<sup>94</sup> Howard, Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience. New Brunswick, New Jersey : Rutgers University Press, 1994, p. 106.

for European dominance -- the catastrophe of World War II (*Lebensraum*) and the Holocaust (*Endlösung*) which reached a new level of cruelty in human history. The generals in Nazi Germany did the soldier's job, they issued the soldier's warnings, and, when they were overruled, they did the soldier's duty. To obey under any condition was exactly the problem of most of the *Wehrmacht*<sup>95</sup> officers, and this problem expressed the enormous problem of Prussian / German military tradition versus individual responsibility and conscience of the officer.

*I am a soldier; it is my duty to obey*, argued Brauchitsch. Others with equally good military logic disagreed : *The highest commanders in time of war*, commented Speidel, *have not always been able to differentiate between the obedience due to God and conscience and the obedience due to men.*<sup>96</sup>

### 1. Civilianism Triumphant, 1933-1945

The consolidation of power by the Nazis depended upon an informal understanding with the military. The military would withdraw from politics, leave this field to the Nazis, and in return the Nazis would push an expanded rearmament program and guarantee the army the monopoly of the military function and autonomy within its own sphere.

This arrangement received explicit sanction in the spring of 1934 when the army agreed to support Hitler for President; Hitler acquiesced in the suppression of Ernst Röhm and the S.A., who had dreams of replacing the Reichswehr with a mass, ideologically oriented, people's army.<sup>97</sup>

In contrast, the German military ideals of obedience, loyalty, honor, intellectual integrity, realism, reason could hardly be further removed from the complete unscrupulousness, amorality, and irrationalism of the Nazis. Hitler had little use for the *accursed objectivity* of the General Staff which he described as *just a club of intellectuals*.

<sup>95</sup> *Wehrmacht* was the name of the German Armed Forces of the Third Reich.

<sup>96</sup> Quoted by Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 122.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

In contrast, a brilliant restatement of the military ethic was made by General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff, in a speech at the reopening of the War Academy in October 1935.

Beck's theme was Moltke's dictum that *Genius is work* and he vigorously attacked *sudden inspirations* and *wishful thinking*. The speech did not make him any friends among the Nazis.<sup>98</sup>

The conflict between the military approach and the Nazi approach was most sharply focused in foreign policy. The Generals wanted to rebuild Germany's armed might, but they wanted to do so slowly, and not in order to wage war but to protect German security. If Germany started war, they argued, she would eventually be confronted by a coalition of powers which would utterly destroy her. In contrast, the Nazis wished to rush mobilization, ignore or brush aside obstacles, and embark upon an adventuristic and aggressive foreign policy. "Step by step during the thirties the military opposed Hitler's aggressive action, and step by step they saw their warnings rejected and Hitler successful."<sup>99</sup> Finally, in the summer of 1938 Hitler forced Beck to resign and replaced him with Franz Halder. What was the consequence of this? First of all Hitler changed the highest officer of the *Wehrmacht* to demonstrate his power and to break resistance of the General Staff against war.

## 2. Military Resistance and the 20 July 1944

As Hitler's campaign against Czechoslovakia mounted, a military group with Halder's cooperation planned a *coup d'état* to seize control of the government before Germany became involved in a disastrous war. The officers, however, were torn with indecision and hesitancy which was only finally resolved by the Allied concession at Munich in 1938. The *coup d'état* was cancelled. Hitler had again defeated his generals. This broke the military.

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

The final technique of the Nazis in altering the complexion of the officer corps was simply the removal of those who adhered to the professional outlook and value. The first major purge was the Werner von Blomberg - Werner von Fritsch Crisis of February 1938. Furthermore, immediately after Munich three more generals, Beck, Wilhelm Adam, and Gerd von Runstedt were retired. In the fall of 1941, after the Germans had been halted in Russia, Walther von Brauchitsch, Runstedt, Bock, and Wilhelm von Leeb left active service.

Later on General Beck was one of the leaders of the uprising against Hitler and his Nazi regime on 20 July 1944.<sup>100</sup> Beck was one of the Generals who committed suicide on the evening of this unsuccessful revolt. "From all time he exemplarily represents the responsible and intellectual General Staff officer who followed his conscience and sacrificed his life in the revolt against the criminal dictator Hitler when he had recognised that only the dictator's death would save Germany from total destruction."<sup>101</sup>

Many officers participated in the attempted assassination against Hitler on 20 July 1944. They took the bitter consequences which included penal liability of their whole families or executions by shooting or hanging, which were inflicted on them by the sentences of the People's Court (*Volksgerichtshof*).

... after the July 20th, 1944 attempt to overthrow the regime, in a mass purge of the high command, twenty generals and one admiral were executed, five other generals committed suicide, and approximately seven hundred officers were either executed or dismissed.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Concerning the military resistance and resistance in general against Hitler and the Nazi regime see, e.g. : Baudissin, Wolf Graf von, "Zum 20. Juli," Rede auf einer Feierstunde zum Gedächtnis der 20. Wiederkehr des Attentats auf Hitler, in Dokumente und Kommentare, Beilage zu Heft 6/1967 Information für die Truppe, Bonn (GE), 1967, S. 3 - 9; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (editor), Aufstand des Gewissens. Militärischer Widerstand gegen Hitler und das NS-Regime 1933-1945, Herford und Bonn (GE) : Verlag E.S. Mittler and Sohn GmbH, 1984; Rothfels, Hans, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung, Frankfurt am Main und Hamburg : Fischer Bücherei, 2. erweiterte Auflage 1969. See also Abenheim, 1988, especially chapter 7. , "The Personnel Screening Boards : The Twentieth of July 1944," pp. 136-147.

<sup>101</sup> Millotat, Christian O.E., Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System. Foreword by Donald Abenheim, Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. 48.

<sup>102</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 121.

Unlike many other professional groups in Hitler Germany, many of the best General Staff officers participated on 20 July 1944 in the *revolt of conscience* against the dictator and followed their code of ethics which ruled out tyranny and crimes.<sup>103</sup>

**To recapitulate**, this chapter focused on problems of civil-military relations and the influence of the military in Germany from the beginning of professionalization until the catastrophe of the Third Reich. It is important to keep in mind three main aspects from these historical perspectives before analyzing the Federal Republic of Germany.

(1) The Weimar Republic underlines the relevance of a successful consolidation of democracy. Democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful transition toward democracy because a viable democracy rather depends on a successful consolidation. After World War I the transition toward democracy was successful. But *Weimar* never was a consolidated democracy, and *Weimar* never solved the problems of civil-military relations.

(2) The failure of the first German democracy opened the way to the Third Reich. After 1933 -- in comparison to the democratic forces of the Weimar Republic -- the *Führer and Reichskanzler* Hitler and his Nazis were much more successful in consolidating their totalitarian system in Germany. The result was the second German bid for European hegemony -- the catastrophe of World War II and the *Holocaust*.

(3) The problem of the *Wehrmacht* officers -- to obey under any condition (*oath of loyalty to Hitler*) versus resistance and participation on the 20 July 1944 (*revolt of conscience*) -- expressed Prussian / German military tradition versus individual responsibility and conscience of the officer.

The total defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II was the prerequisite for democratization in West Germany. With support of the former enemies -- especially the United States -- the Federal Republic of Germany became a consolidated and viable democracy.

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<sup>103</sup> Millotat, p. 50.



#### IV. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

This chapter explains German foreign and security policy, values and interests, and, following them, the role and mission of the *Bundeswehr* today and in future. Furthermore, this chapter focuses on *Innere Führung* -- the key-element of civil-military relations in Germany. National foreign and security policy is only one aspect in the analysis of civil-military relations but a key aspect because the ordering of its civil-military relations is basic to a nation's military security policy. "The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values."<sup>104</sup>

As a result of World War II and the cold war era Germany was divided. The Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949, four years after the end of Nazi Germany and World War II. Six years later West German rearmament led to the birth of the *Bundeswehr*. Until 1989/90 of overriding importance to the Federal Republic of Germany were transition toward and consolidation of democracy, rebuilding of the nearly totally destroyed country, protection against the communist threat, firm integration into the community of Western market democracies, and the regaining of unity in peace and freedom as well as of German sovereignty. These objectives have been attained with the German unification on 3 October 1990.

Before analyzing German foreign and security policy as well as *Innere Führung* as the key element of civil-military relations in Germany, it is very important to remember several special circumstances concerning the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 as well as of the *Bundeswehr* in 1955.

(1) Germany's intentions of imperialism, hegemony and *Lebensraum* came to an abrupt end in 1945. With the catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust Germany also lost its ambitions to be a *great power* in global perspectives.

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<sup>104</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 2.

(2) In spite of German history and tradition of democratic and liberal forces and parties as well as resistance against Hitler and the Nazi regime from inside Germany, the prerequisites for the transition toward and consolidation of democracy after World War II came first of all from outside by intervention. The signature of the *unconditional surrender* of the German armed forces on 7 May 1945 was -- in contrast to the end of World War I -- the sign of total defeat. Germany was occupied by the Allied armed forces which were in command and control of every action.

In answer to a violent and ideological war that Hitler had forced on the world, Nazi Germany's enemies were not satisfied with victory but tried to extirpate all remnants of nazism and remake the country in their image. The principles that were to guide this remaking of a nation were laid down, to the extent they could still agree, by the *nations united for victory* at Potsdam in August 1945. These principles are usually summarized by listing four "d" s : denazification, demilitarization, decentralization; decartelization; to the four, however, there should be added one overarching fifth one : democratization, a term that took on different coloration when interpreted by the Soviets and the Western Allies; hence the split of the country.<sup>105</sup>

(3) The process of transition toward and consolidation of democracy in West Germany was under control as well as protection of the Western Allies, United States, Great Britain, and France. All former Nazi forces which had supported the Nazi regime directly or indirectly were eliminated. In addition, the Basic Law declared it illegal to form any party with national socialist ideology. Neither the old Nazi party and its special police force *Geheime Staatspolizei (GeStaPo)* nor the former *Wehrmacht* or *Waffen SS* could be a threat to transition toward and consolidation of democracy.

(4) The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 was considered a provisional constitution, awaiting the proclamation of an all-German constitution (Art. 146). The state created on the basis of this Basic Law was a state of laws with political

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<sup>105</sup> Herz, John H., "Denazification and Related Policies," in John H. Herz (editor), From Dictatorship To Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Westport and London : Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 17-18.

parties, basic civil rights, the separation of powers and representative government (*Bundestag*).

Some main differences between the Basic Law of 1949 and the constitution of the Weimar Republic -- as a result of lessons learned -- were as follows :<sup>106</sup>

- (a) there was no provision for *emergency decrees* like the famous Art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution;
- (b) there was a mixture of proportional representation and single member districts, no provision for plebiscites, indirect elections of the *Federal President*, whose powers were limited to representative functions;
- (c) only parties receiving more than 5% of the total popular vote were represented in the *Bundestag* -- the *5% clause* designed to prevent party polarization;
- (d) the *Federal Chancellor* was given a strong position through the limitation of parliamentary control over the government -- the *constructive vote of no-confidence* was effective only if the *Bundestag* simultaneously presented a new chancellor with a majority vote;
- (e) a *Constitutional Court*, holding the power of decision over and supplying opinions (on request) on questions of constitutional conflicts; the court also interprets the Basic Law and rules on the unconstitutionality of parties or associations.

(5) The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany also was under control of the Western Allies. The *Bundeswehr* came into existence one decade after the fall of the Third Reich and six years after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Right from the beginning the *Bundeswehr* was an armed force in a democratic state. Furthermore, right from the beginning the *Bundeswehr* was a conscript armed force as well as an alliance armed force.

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<sup>106</sup> Kinder, Hermann and Hilgemann, Werner, The Anchor Atlas of World History, vol. II, From the French Revolution to the American Bicentennial, translated by Ernest A. Menze with maps designed by Harald and Ruth Bukor, New York and London : Anchor Books, 1978, p. 253.

## A. GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

On 3 October 1990, Germany regained its unity. This was the day on which the German people's desire for unity in peace and freedom was fulfilled.<sup>107</sup>

In the second half of 1989, the leadership of the GDR, faced with a mass exodus and increasing protest demonstrations, found itself in a hopeless situation and was unable to withstand these developments.<sup>108</sup> A heated debate on a new law permitting inhabitants of the GDR to travel abroad led to the resignation of the Chairman of the Council of State and his government. On 9 November 1989, the newly formed Politbüro of the SED ordered that the border be opened; the power of the SED collapsed.

Rejected by the vast majority of its citizens, the GDR was now shown to be what it had been all along; a state in which justice did not prevail and freedom was unknown, capable of existing only by means of totalitarian control and the supervision of all spheres of life.<sup>109</sup>

On 28 November 1989, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented a ten-point programme on intra-German policy to the Bundestag which placed the process of German unification in the context of developments throughout Europe. On 18 March 1990, the

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<sup>107</sup> (1) It was due to the courage and determination of the Germans on the other side of the Wall and barbed wire that the power of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and its machinery of repression collapsed in a bloodless revolution within a matter of weeks.

(2) The inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) knew for certain that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would persistently uphold, in its domestic and foreign policy, the claim to reunification and the right of all Germans to self-determination as stated in the Basic Law.

(3) The unity of Germany has been restored in agreement with the Four Powers and with the approval of the international community.

(4) Crucial prerequisites for the historical development of German unification were the support Germany received from her Western allies, the policy of reform initiated by President Mikhail Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union and the dramatic changes that took place in the states of Central Europe, especially in Poland and Hungary.

<sup>108</sup> On 2 October 1989, 20,000 people demonstrated in Leipzig. One week later, this figure had risen to 70,000. In the weeks that followed, hundreds of thousands of people attended the Leipzig *Monday Demonstrations*, taking to the streets to demand reforms and a democratic renewal of the GDR, and chanting : *We are the people*.

<sup>109</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense (editor), White Paper 1994, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, Bonn (GE) : Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1994, p. 12.

first free elections were held in the GDR. The parties that received most votes were those that advocated a rapid and fundamental change in the political order to a system of freedom and democracy.

The first freely elected government, headed by Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière, resolutely pursued the objective of *conducting negotiations with the Federal Government with the aim of bringing about the unity of Germany on the basis of Article 23 of the Basic Law, swiftly and in a responsible manner, and for the entire GDR at the same time*.<sup>110</sup>

The process of German unification led to the signing of historic treaties :

(1) 1 July 1990 : German Unification Treaty; on 1 July 1990, the Monetary, Economic and Social Union between the two German states came into force. The Unification Treaty governed the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with the Article 23 of the Basic Law. It took effect on the night of 2/3 October 1990, thus ending the division of Germany, which had lasted over 45 years.

(2) 16 July 1990 : German - Soviet Union Agreement; this agreement included the following points : (a) the united Germany would be free to choose which alliance it wished to belong to; (b) Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Germany by the end of 1994; (c) over the same period, the peacetime strength of the German armed forces would be reduced to a maximum of 370,000; (d) a comprehensive treaty on German-Soviet relations would be concluded (this treaty was signed in Bonn on 9 November 1990).

(3) 12 September 1990 : Two plus Four Treaty; the governments of the two German states, together with the United States of America, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, drew up the Final Settlement with respect to Germany. The Two plus Four Treaty terminated the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers of Berlin and Germany as a whole. The united Germany gained full sovereignty over its domestic and external affairs.

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

On its way to unity, the reunited Germany has made major contributions to the consolidation of peace and stability in Europe. Germany has confirmed the definitive nature of its borders in the Two plus Four Treaties of 12 September 1990 and in the treaty signed with Poland on 14 September 1990. Furthermore, the Federal Government has reaffirmed that Germany will not wage a war of aggression and that it will renounce the manufacture and possession of and control over NBC weapons. The Preamble to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany states that the foreign and security policy objective to Germany is to *serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe.*<sup>111</sup>

After decades of painful division, we have regained the unity of our fatherland in peace and freedom. Here, too, a decisive factor was that the Federal Republic of Germany unwaveringly adhered to the two mainstays of its foreign and security policy -- the political unification of Europe and the transatlantic partnership with the United States of America and with Canada.<sup>112</sup>

## **1. German Values and Interests**

The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is committed to peace, and its foremost task is to safeguard, promote and shape peace within Germany as well as in the international community.

Peace prevails when freedom and justice are realized and the dignity of man is protected. These supreme values are the universally binding core of human rights, which every state, regardless of different religious persuasions and cultural traditions, has to respect and protect. The obligation to protect the dignity of man, to ensure peace, freedom and justice is a yardstick against which the legitimacy of politics can be measured. These values are indivisible. Serving peace also means striving for a world in which everyone can live in freedom, peace and dignity.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>112</sup> Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in ibid., p. vi.

<sup>113</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 39.

The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany has laid major cornerstones for determining German security interests by establishing a constitutional mandate for peace, to work towards European security, to settle conflicts by peaceful means and to join a system of collective security. German security policy has to take account of several constant political factors and parameters with long-term effects. First, Germany has a geopolitically central location with the most neighbours in Europe. Second, the economic situation of Germany as an industrialized nation depends on exports and is firmly interwoven with the world economy. All this sets standards for the objectives, substance and procedures of German policy and plays a part in the way in which it is perceived by Germany's neighbors. German foreign and security policy is guided by five central interests:<sup>114</sup>

- (1) Preservation of the freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and the territorial integrity of the German state;
- (2) Integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for democracy, the rule of law and prosperity in Europe means peace and security for Germany, too;
- (3) The lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international stability;
- (4) The familiarization of our neighbours in Eastern Europe with Western structures in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership and the creation of a new cooperative security order embracing all the states of Europe;
- (5) Worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just world economic order based on market principles, for the security of the individual states is guaranteed only in a system of global security with peace, justice and well-being for everyone.

German foreign and security policy involves the interlinking and fair reconciliation of interests in, for and with the international community. As a democratic, free and prosperous nation, Germany's interest is to actively participate, as a matter of principle, in

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

international peacekeeping tasks on the basis of the UN Charter. On the basis of values and interests, the lessons of history and the transformed security situation, German security policy is geared to attaining twelve goals:<sup>115</sup>

- (1) Protection of Germany and its citizens against danger from without and political blackmail;
- (2) Prevention, containment and termination of crises and conflicts that could impair the integrity and stability of Germany or its allies;
- (3) Development of the security relationship with the USA, which is based on common values and similar interests;
- (4) Strengthening of NATO as a community of shared values and a defensive alliance of Euro-Atlantic democracies and continuing adaptation of the Alliance to current security challenges, including its opening to the east;
- (5) Partnership with equal rights between a united Europe and North America;
- (6) Intensification of European integration by expanding the European Union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European defence identity; development of the WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance;
- (7) Enlargement of the European Union and Western European Union (WEU);
- (8) Strengthening of the United Nations as a global conflict-settling authority and the OSCE as a regional arrangement;
- (9) Creation of a new cooperative security order between all states participating in the OSCE;
- (10) Consolidation and expansion of a regionally and globally effective security order of organizations that complement and strengthen one another;

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., pp. 42-43.

(11) Continuation of an arms control process based on the goal of foresighted conflict prevention, with a view to creating a cooperative security order as a basis for lasting peace and stability in and for Europe;

(12) Promotion of democratization and socio-economic progress in Europe and throughout the world.

## **2. Areas of Activity and Influence**

Today Germany is a member of the United Nations (UN), a participant in the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a member of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) as well as of the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU). Germany's intention is to cooperate with its partners in linking these institutions together and turning them into a strong security order. Each institution has its own particular strengths; therefore, the intention is to complement each other and to use them flexibly because they are helping to extend political stability to Central and Eastern Europe and into the Commonwealth of Independent States. The principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), the standards set by the OSCE and the code of values contained in the Basic Law are the guidelines for Germany's foreign and security policy.

In compliance with the UN Charter, Art. 24 of the Basic Law states that to maintain peace, the Federal Republic of Germany may become part of a mutual collective security system. The object of such a security system must be to establish and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and between the peoples of the world.

When Germany became a member of the United Nations in 1973, it committed itself without reservation to the rights and duties associated with membership. Germany is involved in all the world organization's political, economic, legal, social and humanitarian functions. The principal aim of German foreign policy remains to help maintain peace in the world.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

### **3. The Role and Mission of the *Bundeswehr***

The radically changed security environment and Germany's increased international responsibility have an impact on the role, mission, structure, and equipment of the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>117</sup> Since the end of the cold war and German unification, it has been undergoing the greatest transformation in its history.

First, the *Bundeswehr* had to disband the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee -- NVA), build up the *Bundeswehr* in Eastern Germany, reduce the armed forces of the united Germany by one third and re-station a considerable part of them, while at the same time orienting them to new tasks. This process was largely completed by the end of 1994, when the total strength of the armed forces' military personnel was reduced to the contractually agreed ceiling of 370,000.

Against the background of the continuing evolution of the security situation and limited resources in the post-cold war era, the second challenge was to define in detail the armed forces that Germany wishes to have and retain in terms of their capabilities and target structures and to adapt them in such a way that they will be able to accomplish their tasks in the future.<sup>118</sup> The *Bundeswehr* will perform two principal defense functions.

On the one hand, it must be able to cooperate with allies and partners in order to contribute at short notice to managing the likely international crises and conflicts; on the other hand, it must have the capability to build up and employ defensive forces adequate to deal with what is at present an unlikely contingency, but at the same time the worst-case scenario, namely having to defend Germany and the Alliance.<sup>119</sup>

The mission of the *Bundeswehr* is based on the obligation set forth in the Basic Law, under which Germany must preserve the unity of the nation and the state and serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe. Its reflects Germany's security-related needs and security interests.

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

The *Bundeswehr* :

- (1) Protects Germany and its citizens against political blackmail and danger from without;
- (2) Advances military stability and European integration;
- (3) Defends Germany and its allies;
- (4) Serves world peace and international security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- (5) Provides disaster relief, saves life and supports humanitarian activities.<sup>120</sup>

Although the security environment, role, structure, size, and mission of the *Bundeswehr* have changed drastically since 1990, some fundamental conditions and values of the *Bundeswehr* did not change.

First, the *Bundeswehr* is still an army in a democracy -- the unified Federal Republic of Germany. Second, the *Bundeswehr* is still an alliance armed force. It is integrated in the force structure of an alliance made up of democratic states. Third, the *Bundeswehr* will remain a conscript army -- for historico-political, security-related, social and military reasons :

- (1) Universal conscription is part of the defence culture that has evolved over the decades in our country. It is an expression of the individual citizen's willingness to take his personal share of the responsibility for protecting his polity. The defence of freedom, justice and human dignity is a matter that concerns everyone.
- (2) Universal conscription firmly establishes the armed forces in society. Through its conscripts, the *Bundeswehr* remains in close contact with every segment of the population, particularly the young generation. Conscription creates a high degree of social awareness and interest in issues concerning security and armed forces among policy-makers and in society. It enhances people's consciousness of their common responsibility for the polity.

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

(3) Universal conscription ensures that the armed forces obtain all manpower they need. Compared with Germany's partners and neighbours in Europe, the overall strength of its armed forces corresponds to its political and economic importance, its central location and the size of its population.

(4) Universal conscription ensures that the *Bundeswehr* is operational. By enabling the *Bundeswehr* to call up reservists, it ensures the armed forces' mobilization capability and sustainability in action. It establishes a firm base for recruitment and enhances professionalism in the *Bundeswehr*, because it can fall back on a cross-section of young men's abilities, skills and professional qualifications. The *Bundeswehr* currently recruits around one half of its regulars and temporary-career volunteers from its pool of conscripts.

(5) In the new Länder, conscription is highly instrumental in anchoring the *Bundeswehr* in people's minds. It is promoting the exchange of views and ideas between young people in East and West and helping to complete internal unification.

(6) Conscripts take part in United Nations peace missions and humanitarian relief activities on a voluntary basis.

(7) The concept of *Innere Führung* and the model of the democratic citizen in uniform are hallmarks of the German *Bundeswehr*, reinforced in its values during the process of German unification.<sup>121</sup>

## B. BUNDESWEHR IN STATE AND SOCIETY

The *Bundeswehr* is one of several tools of German foreign and security policy and remains the visible expression of the sovereignty of Germany. Universal conscription is and will remain the expression of the individual citizen's personal share of responsibility for a life in peace and freedom.<sup>122</sup>

The problem of civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s was solved first of all by basic civilian control, e.g., basic law, institutions, a civilian as Minister of Defense, and then -- in addition -- by *Innere Führung*. *Innere Führung* is a result of the specific German history and lessons learned.

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., pp. 85-86.

<sup>122</sup> Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in Federal Ministry of Defense, p. vii.

## 1. *Innere Führung*

The key element of German rearmament and civil-military relations is the concept of *Innere Führung*. "The concept of Innere Führung harmonizes the principles of freedom held by a democratic constitutional state and the principle of order and function that armed forces must observe to accomplish the mission assigned to them under the constitution."<sup>123</sup>

The principles and fundamentals of *Innere Führung* combine the demands of the military mission and duty with the dignity and rights of the citizen. They are designed to balance the tensions that arise from the military obligations of a member of the armed forces and the rights and liberties of a citizen. Innere Führung is an integral part of every leadership activity in all domains and at all levels. It constitutes the fundamental principle of leadership and conduct, and as such pervades every aspect of routine. Innere Führung leaves its mark on both the spirit and attitude prevalent in the Bundeswehr. This concept is a unique and very complex one; therefore, it also suffers misinterpretations, misunderstandings and non-acceptance. Often serious critiques come from civilians and soldiers who either do not know the concept and its complexity or do not accept the fact that the unique German history -- World War I, World War II, and Holocaust -- really legitimates a unique concept of civil-military relations including a special type of soldier as a citizen in uniform. For example, Huntington's analysis of German history is very good, but when he analyses the first ideas of *Innere Führung* in 1956/57 -- the keystone of civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Germany until today -- he fails.

The aristocratic army of Frederick the Great was destroyed by Napoleon. The professional army created by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was destroyed by Hitler. Now the proposal was to create a democratic army, an ideologically motivated force embodying subjective rather than objective civilian control. In part, this approach was a reaction against the professionalism of the past and the product of the false identification of that professionalism with Hitler. Ironically, it was also in part an imitation of the American conquerors of Hitler. But the changes of the Bonn government were not for the better. They were a retrogression to a more primitive form of civil-military relations. Inevitably they will foster the permanent embroilment of the German military in politics and reduce the

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<sup>123</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 132.

fighting effectiveness of the new army. Despite what Herr Blank had to say, a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than by a democratic force. The Federal German Republic possess the confidence of its citizens and strong central institutions such as the Weimar Republic never had. The obstacles to civilian control which existed in the twenties no longer exist. It would be tragic if the new German democracy did not seize the opportunity to reestablish an effective system of civilian control and a professional officer corps. It could do far worse than to resurrect the tradition of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz.<sup>124</sup>

This long quotation is necessary to underline how important Huntington's misunderstanding and / or misinterpretation is. Perhaps Huntington has not had enough information about *Innere Führung* which was developed in the 1950s and early 1960s. But Huntington's misinterpretation includes the main arguments of criticism and / or non-acceptance of *Innere Führung* until today. And this is serious because *Innere Führung* -- in theory as well as in practice -- became exactly the opposite of Huntington's interpretation.

First; *Innere Führung* is not a more primitive form of civil-military relations which "will foster the permanent embroilment of the German military in politics and reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army." Rather, it is a more qualitative -- in Huntington's theory not existing -- form of civil-military relations as a result of the special guilt and responsibility in history. Probably the world has seen enough German military effectiveness especially in World War I and in World War II.

Second, Huntington's argument that "a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than by a democratic force" is simplistic. The *Bundeswehr* is very proud to be a democratic *and* professional army on the basis of the *Innere Führung* including civilian control / civilian supremacy and civil-military cooperation (*Primat der Politik*), integration into state and society (*Staatsbürger in Uniform*), a high responsibility toward democracy (*Politische Bildung - Protector of Democracy*), and high military skills (*Auftragstaktik*).

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<sup>124</sup> Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 123-124.

Here in the United States, among the members of our military, the Bundeswehr has long been regarded as a military force of superb quality, expertly trained and prepared for battle; truly an ally whom we would be both proud and fortunate to have on our flank in battle. The same is true today.<sup>125</sup>

*Innere Führung* is practised by way of training, leadership, care and welfare, political education, military law and military discipline. In this way, German soldiers learn about the political and legal reasons for military service and are made to appreciate the purpose of the military mission. *Innere Führung* promotes the integration of the Bundeswehr and its military personnel into state and society and helps foster appreciation of the Bundeswehr's role in the Alliance and collective security system. When the principles of *Innere Führung* are observed, education and training make the soldiers more willing to perform their duties conscientiously, to assume responsibility and to cooperate with others; they also promote discipline and cohesion among the troops. *Innere Führung* takes the code of values and legal system as the basis for internal discipline and increases efficiency and professionalism in the Bundeswehr.<sup>126</sup>

In accordance with the concept of *Innere Führung*, the German soldier is a citizen in uniform. This model is a guide and yardstick for leadership, education and training in the *Bundeswehr*. The model of the citizen in uniform stands for the citizen who is prepared to defend his country as a willing member of its armed forces and who assumes responsibility for the freedom and human dignity of others. He is a politically educated and responsible citizen who recognizes and is a firm advocate of the political causes, conditions and consequences of the military action he takes.

*Innere Führung* has made the *Bundeswehr* an integral and natural component of the democratic state order and society. It is at least in the German case an outstanding concept for the comprehensive integration of armed forces into a democratic state.

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<sup>125</sup> Shalikashvili, John M., General, United States Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, May 1995, in Jörg Schönbohm, Two Armies And One Fatherland. The End of the Nationale Volksarmee, 1996, Providence and Oxford : Berghahn Books, p. vi.

<sup>126</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 132.

## 2. Development of *Innere Führung*

The need for a concept of *Innere Führung* became evident when, following the demilitarization of West German society after World War II, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany came under pressure to provide armed forces for the common defense of Western Europe.

The Berlin blockade in 1948 started the cold war. As a consequence of this development, the United States began to consider with seriousness the need for West German rearmament. Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized the need for a common Western defence and understood as well that own armed forces were part of a nation's claim to sovereignty. Furthermore, Konrad Adenauer and his advisors had recognized that German forces, whether part of a European force or independent, would need to be accepted by the German public as well as by the Western Allies.<sup>127</sup>

In the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 the Allies had decided that "... the German educational system must be supervised so that Nazi and militaristic precepts are eliminated completely..."<sup>128</sup> In the post-war period the aims of the occupation forces matched the natural inclination of the German population so well that in 1954 Paul Sethe could write in the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*:

The military tradition of the Germans was broken off in 1945. In the nine years since, memories and sentiments have become overwhelming among young people that make it difficult to link up with this heritage. Two lost wars with their terrible casualties; great parts of our cities will remain in rubble for long to come; the appeal to idealism and a sense of sacrifice have been brutally abused and arouse today only bitterness among many; the long struggle of the occupiers against German soldierly pride has not been without effect; the division of Germany paralyzes many.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>127</sup> Victorsen, Mark E., "Mission in the East, The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States," Newport, Rhode Island : U.S. Naval War College, Center for Naval War Studies, Newport Paper, no. 7, June 1994, p. 3-4.

<sup>128</sup> Quoted by Ralf Zoll, "The German Armed Forces," in Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (editors), The Political Education of Soldiers, Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1983, p. 213.

<sup>129</sup> Quoted by Gordon A. Craig, in Abenheim, Donald, Reforging the Iron Cross : The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1988, p. xvi.

The challenges that faced the founders of the *Bundeswehr* were to overcome this distrust of all things military, which was a legacy of the military's misuse by the Nazis, and to provide a *raison d'être* for military forces in a democracy that would confer legitimacy on them in a modern pluralistic society. At the same time, they recognized that new concepts of professionalism and leadership were needed within the armed forces in order to protect the state and the individual soldier from the excesses of a reactionary military elite. "In short, they were faced with the problem of the proper ordering of the military within their democratic society."<sup>130</sup> In other Western democracies the development of these relations, the growth of a military tradition supporting democratic social values, and the evolution of an officer corps that embodies ideals necessary to sustain these values in a military environment have generally taken place over an extended and unbroken national history. Even when controversy arises, it does so within the context of a general understanding of the utility of the armed forces and their proper place in society.

In the 1950s domestic discussion the founders of the Bundeswehr faced the problems of defining these relations without benefit of history; of discovering a tradition that would encourage their proper development; and of providing leaders, most of whom would come at first from a military with anti-democratic roots, with the tools and the will to support the social values necessary for the proper functioning of a military within a democracy. They would have to do all of this in the glare of publicity and through dialogue with a public which, for the most part, had no desire to face the questions it was being asked.<sup>131</sup>

A number of people, who included former Wehrmacht officers, academics, and politicians, worked on the conceptualization of the ideas of *Innere Führung* during the 1950s and early 1960s. At the same time *Innere Führung* became most closely associated in the public's mind with Wolf Count von Baudissin. Baudissin, who was a former Wehrmacht officer, provided some earlier input for *Innere Führung*.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Victorson, p. 4.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>132</sup> The Federal Armed Forces Command and General Staff College (*Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*) in Hamburg is the highest military education and training institution for all three services. It consists of two barracks, which are named *Clausewitz-Kaserne* and *Generalleutnant-Graf-von-Baudissin-Kaserne*.

While the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany had to be amended to address the requirements of the armed forces, and separate legislation was enacted to clarify the legal position of the soldier, the basis for the *Innere Führung* was stated in the first article of the Basic Law as it was written in 1949 :

The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.<sup>133</sup>

This personal dignity is not lost when one becomes a soldier. The soldier retains the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as necessary to carry out his military duties.<sup>134</sup> The soldier is a citizen in uniform (*Staatsbürger in Uniform*). In the oath sworn by regular and temporary-career volunteers and in the solemn pledge made by conscripts, Bundeswehr personnel promise to loyally serve the Federal Republic of Germany and bravely defend the rights and freedom of the German people.<sup>135</sup>

The oath and solemn pledge place members of the armed forces under a moral obligation to defend the code of values set forth in the Basic Law. International law and human rights are major components of this code. It forms the basis for the simple laws, including the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, on which a serviceman's obligation to be obedient is legally founded and limited by law.

The German soldier must acknowledge and accept the principles of democracy as expressed in the Basic Law and dedicate himself to their preservation.<sup>136</sup> These principles include civilian control and civilian supremacy of the military (*Primat der Politik*). In the German parliamentary democracy, military personnel can rest assured that the decisions taken by the executive are lawful and are open to public scrutiny and judicial review.

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<sup>133</sup> Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, in Dieter Hesselberger, Das Grundgesetz, Kommentar für die politische Bildung, 5. 1988, p. 59.

<sup>134</sup> Paragraph 6, "Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Soldatengesetz)" -- Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, in Hannelore Kaeber and Bernhard Tripp (editors), Politische Bildung und Bundeswehr : Beiträge einer Fachtagung, 1984, p. 261.

<sup>135</sup> Paragraph 7, "Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Soldatengesetz)", in *ibid.*, p. 261.

<sup>136</sup> Paragraph 8, "Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Soldatengesetz)", in Kaeber and Tripp, 1984., p. 261.

Any order they receive from their superiors must be within the law. The serviceman can therefore be certain that he will only be employed after thorough and conscientious consideration has been given to a situation and only if there is a sound legal basis for such action. ... Combat will remain the *ultima ratio*.<sup>137</sup>

Furthermore, the soldier is not to follow orders which assault human dignity or would otherwise be illegal.<sup>138</sup> Theodor Blank, first Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, expressed it as follows : "*Democracy can be defended only by democrats, and freedom only by those who experience it themselves.*"<sup>139</sup>

Baudissin wished to embed the soldier firmly in the democratic society and to leave as little as possible in the purely military sphere. Military tradition was a thorny matter, because although civil-military relations in Germany between 1871 and 1914 reflected an extraordinary degree of objective civilian control and military professionalism founded upon a high level and restricted scope of military authority, the German armed forces' political manipulations during and after World War I and their culpability in the Nazi regime and World War II hardly furnished material for the tradition of armed forces in a democratic society.

Traditions worthy of study and emulation were eventually found. These included the heroes of the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon and the General Staff officers who conspired to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944.<sup>140</sup>

However, these latter were not uncontroversial, and the whole question of what constitutes a valid tradition for the *Bundeswehr* concerning the former *Reichswehr* as well as former *Wehrmacht* still remains open today, over fifty years after the end of World War II. In contrast, only three years after German unity there was no doubt about it that the

<sup>137</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 134.

<sup>138</sup> Paragraph 11, "Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Soldatengesetz)", in Kaeber and Tripp, 1984., p. 261.

<sup>139</sup> Quoted by Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 123.

<sup>140</sup> Victorson, p. 6.

former National People's Army of the GDR -- because it was the army of the party and the class in a communist system -- cannot constitute a valid tradition for the Bundeswehr.<sup>141</sup>

There is obviously still a German problem : to overcome the country's own history until 1945. This problem we must keep in mind when addressing the legacy of the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee - NVA). The problem to overcome German history is neither a special problem of the *Bundeswehr* nor a weak point of *Innere Führung* -- it is a problem of the German society in general.

### 3. Challenges for *Innere Führung*

On 3 October 1990 the *Bundeswehr* took control of the personnel, equipment, and installations of what had been the NVA. The act of taking over the NVA was massive because of the sheer amount of equipment, ammunition, and acreage for which the *Bundeswehr* found itself responsible in the new federal states, and it was historic because soldiers who had faced each other across a deep ideological divide for over thirty years would now be serving together.<sup>142</sup>

Securing, inventoring, and disposing of the materiel of the former NVA was to be the major mission of the *Bundeswehr* throughout its first years in the new states. This mission has been complicated by three factors :

- (1) the almost immediate need to support the liberation of Kuwait through materiel shipments and support of departing U.S. soldiers;
- (2) the additional responsibility to assist the Western group of Soviet Forces in an orderly withdrawal from German territory;

<sup>141</sup> Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Fü S I 4 (editor), ZDv 10/1 - Innere Führung, Bonn (GE), 1993, preface no. 3.

<sup>142</sup> Schönbohm, Jörg, Two Armies And One Fatherland. The End of the Nationale Volksarmee, Providence and Oxford : Berghahn Books, 1996, preface, pp. 36-37. "The size of the NVA -- while it was under the GDR government -- had been reduced by mid-September from 175,000 to about 103,000; the military intelligence service, the military prosecutors and the propaganda units had been disbanded. Thus on 2 October we had new information about the number of personnel and the amount of equipment available. According to that information we estimated the personnel strength about 103,000, including 32,000 officers and 20,000 NCO's. We assessed the equipment strength as consisting of 2,300 battle tanks, 7,800 armoured fighting vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces, 400 fighter aircraft, 71 warships, 50 attack helicopters, 1.2 million small arms and 300,000 tons of ammunition."

(3) the long-term requirement to reduce the Bundeswehr's size by almost 30 percent.

"The unification of Germany came quickly and surprisingly -- hoped for and desired by many, opposed and obstructed by others."<sup>143</sup> Of more lasting significance, however, was the human impact of the unification. Lieutenant General Jörg Schönbohm's estimate of this aspect was as follows :

As no one knew how many career and short-service men would really still be in the NVA after 3 October, the decisive question for us was : how could we take control of these enormous quantities of equipment and guarantee that it was securely guarded. What is more, it was not clear how far the officers, who had been indoctrinated by the Communists and trained to hate us, were really ready to serve, at least a transitional period. Would a sense of responsibility be stronger than the Socialist military training ? I was optimistic.<sup>144</sup>

In the midst of the changes wrought by unification, the *Bundeswehr* took on missions for which its origin and history had uniquely qualified it. First, there was the self-imposed requirement to select former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers who requested active duty in the *Bundeswehr* and then train them to assume the functions of leaders in the armed forces of a democratic society. Second, the *Bundeswehr* would have to build legitimacy for the armed forces among an East German population that had learned to distrust the military.

*Innere Führung* which had stood the *Bundeswehr* in good stead in similar endeavors at its beginning and throughout its short history, was used again to meet these new challenges. There is no doubt about it that the principles of *Innere Führung* played a key-role in the early development of the *Bundeswehr* as an army in a democracy and in its acceptance by the civilian populace of the Federal Republic of Germany, and these principles have promoted the same processes in the new German states. Although the NVA was not the army the *Bundeswehr* thought it was facing during the years of the Cold

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., preface, p. viii.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

War era, its true legacy is being surmounted by leaders well-versed in *Innere Führung*. Grave problems remain, however. A sensitive application of *Innere Führung* can help solve some of these problems, and some of them mirror issues from the *Bundeswehr's* own history, while others, such as the economic conditions in the new states that adversely affect soldiers and civilians alike, are not amenable to correction by the military alone.<sup>145</sup>

In discussing the role of *Innere Führung* in the *Bundeswehr's* mission in the new states since 3 October 1990, one must keep in mind that *Innere Führung* addressed a number of audiences. First, it had to address those in uniform on 3 October 1990, especially those in leadership roles. Second, it had to deal with the attitudes and needs of the young men in the new states who would be conscripted or recruited into the *Bundeswehr* and those who would become its officers and noncommissioned officers. Third, it had to come to terms with the civilian population.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Victorsen, p. 2.

<sup>146</sup> Victorson, pp. 25-31.

By 3 October 1990 the generals and admirals had already been dismissed from the NVA, as had been the political officers. NVA officers were being given the opportunity and being encouraged to leave the service with a small severance payment or, if over fifty years of age, with a pension, in order to reduce the number who would have to be involuntarily cut at a later date. About 60 percent of the 32,000 officers on hand on 3 October 1990 elected this option.

By the early spring of 1991, about 6,000 of the approximately 11,000 former NVA officers who had requested to serve a two-year probation period in the *Bundeswehr* were informed that their applications had been accepted. Those who were not accepted left the service in the following months.

Those accepted had already experienced a reduction in rank -- often as many as two pay grades -- in order to bring them into step with the *Bundeswehr's* promotion system, which was a great deal slower than the NVA's had been. These officers could now request consideration for professional status in order to remain in the service indefinitely. For these officers, much would depend on the single officer efficiency report they would receive from their commanders the following April, as well as on the findings of the independent Gauck commission, which was searching for evidence of Stasi collaboration.

Officers in leadership positions and noncommissioned officers, the majority of whose requests for two-year service status had been accepted because of the shortage of noncommissioned officers in the new states, underwent *supplemental training*, which consisted of courses at an officers' or noncommissioned officers' school to bring them up to the level of leadership ability corresponding with their ranks, courses at a branch school to become proficient with the duties required by their positions, and practical experience with their sister units in the old states before returning for duty with their own commands. For field grade staff officers, however, this training consisted of a two-week course on *Innere Führung* and on-the-job training.

For the officers of the old NVA, 1992 was a difficult year. The two-year probation period would come to an end, and for those who wished to stay, the officer efficiency report they would receive from their commanders, any academic reports they received from Bundeswehr schools attended, and finally the decision of an independent, citizens' screening board would be key to their future careers. In total, approximately 3,000 officers, usually younger, lower-ranking officers, were selected for career or long-term service (six to twelve years).

*Innere Führung* was realized in two ways. First, through formal training at the Center for *Innere Führung*, in the troop or branch schools, and in the field. Second, through the personal example (*Führen durch Vorbild*) provided by soldiers of the old *Bundeswehr*, who had lived with the principles of *Innere Führung* throughout their professional lives, who honestly believed in them and their effectiveness in providing a compass for the military in a democratic society and had internalized them to such a degree that these principles informed their actions and attitudes.

In the new states, political training in the units consisted largely of instruction on how to get along and survive in the chaos of democracy and capitalism. Even after attending leadership training and courses, officers and noncommissioned officers had difficulty understanding the principles of *Innere Führung* and explaining them to others. Sometimes the participants only half-heartedly adopted the principles and aims of *Innere Führung* and their acceptance was based on the pragmatic formula : "If it helps me, it's all-right."<sup>147</sup>

In any event, young soldiers from old and new states did not like to serve under officers and noncommissioned officers of the old NVA. Even if some soldiers were having trouble grasping the formal lessons on *Innere Führung*, and even before things settled down enough in the units to conduct political training, these soldiers were witnessing the principles of *Innere Führung* being lived by the soldiers who came from the old states.

Perhaps this is the main factor why *Innere Führung* despite all problems became very successful. The principles of *Innere Führung* first of all must be lived by the superiors rather than trained in special courses (*Vorbildfunktion*). From the very beginning, visibly at least, there was to be no difference between soldiers of the old NVA and the old *Bundeswehr* -- there were to be no second-class soldiers.

The following four examples underline this very important aspect :<sup>148</sup>

(1) The very decision to send so few soldiers from the West was based on a desire not to insult the dignity and feelings of the officers and men of the old NVA any more than was necessary, and this desire was rooted in the principle of *Innere Führung*.

<sup>147</sup> Victorson, p. 29.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

(2) The same was true of the decision of the Commander, Bundeswehr Command, East, concerning the uniform. There were enough fatigue uniforms to clothe everyone in his command, but not enough dress uniforms. Lieutenant General Schönbohm, with permission granted by the Minister of Defense, ordered that all soldiers in the Bundeswehr East wear fatigues, to include himself and his staff officers.

(3) The career cadres of the former NVA were largely officers, and the proportion of officers were at least three times as high as in the Bundeswehr.<sup>149</sup> Professional training was intensive and led to many academic qualifications; specialisations which had been obtained were further developed in the management of personnel. In this lay a certain strength for the leadership apparatus; the price, however, was that NVA officers were narrowly restricted to their own sphere of work and knew little of other areas. NVA officers -- with the exception of the highest levels -- were intentionally prevented from making independent decisions.

The former NVA required highly specialised experts who had no overview of the whole system. Room for manoeuvre was restricted by numerous regulations.<sup>150</sup>

The Bundeswehr practise of ordering a soldier to carry out a mission but letting the individual decide on the method -- *Führung durch Auftrag* -- did not exist in the NVA ... Training in the Bundeswehr is in complete contrast. We train the career and short-service soldiers to be able to carry out orders in an independent manner. This means that when an order is given only the goal, but not the method of achieving it, is specified, and this gives the responsible person on the spot greater freedom of manoeuvre. This procedure requires appropriate training and the ability to take one's own decisions. Because of this, considerable demands are made

<sup>149</sup> Schönbohm, preface, pp. 34-35.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., pp. 35-36. A further particular aspect was that in the GDR military administration -- which according to the Federal Basic Law is in the hands of civilian officials -- was exclusively carried out by servicemen. In addition, the NVA undertook many duties which in the Federal Republic of Germany are the responsibility of civilian officials or private bodies, ranging from telecommunications installations and the subsidising of sport in armed forces' sport clubs, to running school and kindergarten canteens. Furthermore, in small garrison towns in particular, the NVA carried out many public functions and consequently had a dominant role. From 1985 the economic situation of the GDR grew dramatically worse. From this time onwards up to 55,000 NVA personnel had to work in the general economy, while the armed forces continued to be kept at an eighty-five per cent state of readiness. On 3 October 1990, the day on which the NVA was taken over, it was no longer the highly trained militarily and ideologically reliable army of previous years. The extreme example of this was a mutiny of conscripts in January 1990 at the Beelitz base, south-west of Berlin.

of the individual, in order to achieve suitable training and education of junior officers and NCOs.<sup>151</sup>

(4) Former NVA soldiers were repeatedly surprised by the openness and frankness of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers. For an army who had conducted its business behind closed doors and with highly formalized and rigid speech patterns, and whose officers were inaccessible to the enlisted men, the informality and accessibility of officers like the commander of *Bundeswehr* himself, Lieutenant General Schönbohm, came as a pleasant surprise. This openness was a key asset for *Bundeswehr* soldiers in dealing with their counterparts from the East.<sup>152</sup>

But there seems to be still a problem :

... the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr wrote that as the NVA had been, until 9 November 1989, an *Army of the Party and instrument of a dictatorship*, it would cease to exist and ... *Symbols, uniforms, and traditions of the NVA will not be transferred* to the Bundeswehr. The problem, as the Bundeswehr found in relation to the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, is that traditions do not die that easily ...<sup>153</sup>

There is no doubt about it that coming to grips with the principles of *Innere Führung* also forced those who remained to confront their past and their role in supporting the SED regime. In doing this, they did not always receive the support they should have expected from the soldiers of the old *Bundeswehr*. But the overall extent of the Westerners' openness and willingness to work together usually became evident to the more perceptive officers of the old NVA when they considered what they would have done had history taken a different turn and the NVA had taken over the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>152</sup> Victorson, pp. 29-30.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., pp. 32 and 47. "Answers to the question range from NVA officers saying they would not even have shaken hands with Bundeswehr officers to the problem of shaking hands never coming up, because all *Bundeswehr* officers would have been in prison camps."

*To recapitulate*, this chapter focused on German democratization after World War II, German foreign and security policy including German unification, and *Innere Führung* as the key element of civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is important to keep in mind five main aspects from the analysis of the Federal Republic of Germany and *Innere Führung*.

(1) The concept of *Innere Führung* is a key element of civil-military relations in Germany. Despite all criticism this concept was and still is very successful at least in the German case.

(2) *Innere Führung* reflects a permanent process with interdependent relations between state, society, and *Bundeswehr*. It includes the three aspects which should characterize a modern concept of civil-military relations :

- civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.

(3) The German *Bundeswehr* is very proud to be a democratic *and* professional army on the basis of the *Innere Führung* including civilian control / civilian supremacy as well as civil-military cooperation (*Primat der Politik*), integration into state and society as a citizen in uniform (*Staatsbürger in Uniform*), a high responsibility toward democracy (*Politische Bildung - Protector of Democracy*), and high military skills (*Auftragstaktik*).

(4) *Innere Führung* has become a model for new democracies especially in Eastern Europe, when they consider how to rebuild their armed forces and to solve the problems of civil-military relations in the ongoing process of transition towards and consolidation of democracy:

(5) But these countries including Russia should keep in mind the special circumstances of German democratization after World War II before using the German *Bundeswehr* and *Innere Führung* as a positive example.

## V. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - R U S S I A N H I S T O R Y

Because of the complexity of the Russian / Soviet history this chapter analyses only some selected issues of civil-military relations and its problems and focuses on military reforms, professionalism and civil-military conflict in Imperial Russia from 1863-1917 as well as on the party-state system after 1917, the military in the party-state and civil-military conflict in the Soviet Union until 1991.

### A. IMPERIAL RUSSIA

William C. Fuller argues that in Imperial Russia, as elsewhere, professional soldiers represented a distinct subgroup of professional men.<sup>155</sup> Because of the difficulties which confuse objective evaluations of military competence in the theoretical debate,<sup>156</sup> Fuller prefers a definition of military professionalism in which competence is deemphasized while *consciousness* is stressed. He defines military professionalism by five criteria:<sup>157</sup>

- (1) special knowledge and skill in schools of military learning or by experience in the field;
- (2) standards of performance within the officer corps;
- (3) group identity;
- (4) recognition and articulation of the special interests of the military;
- (5) autonomy -- if the army cannot itself control admissions to the officer corps or promotion within it, it nonetheless demands that considerations of *military expertise* weight heavily in these decisions.

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<sup>155</sup> Fuller, William C. Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 5.

<sup>156</sup> For instance, Huntington, with the example of the American army uppermost in mind, argues that professionalism is a strong bulwark against military coups (Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), while Samuel E. Finer, who derives much of his evidence from the history of officer corps in the Third World, argues the reverse (Finer, Samuel E., The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics, New York : Praeger Publishers, 1962).

<sup>157</sup> Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, pp. 5-6. In comparison, Huntington defines professionalism by three criteria : expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (Huntington, 1957, pp. 8-18).

Following this definition, professionalism is -- like Huntington's definition -- not the equivalent of excellence or even competence. The *rightness* or *wrongness* of the tsarist army's military doctrine is likewise an invalid measure of its professionalism.<sup>158</sup>

### 1. The Miliutin Reforms, 1863-1880

General D.A. Miliutin, War Minister from 1863 to 1880, implemented a series of liberal, imaginative, and integrally related reforms which had as their goal the infusion of efficiency and competence into every aspect of Russian military life. Furthermore, under his leadership the army was rearmed twice.

The Miliutin period from 1863 to 1880 was a time of promise for the Russian army, and the Russian army had taken its first step towards professionalism. Miliutin's three key aspects of reform were organization, education, and universal conscription. The law of universal conscription of 1874 was the quintessential illustration of Miliutin's reformism : while using the resources of the Empire to modernize the army, he also wished to use the resources of the army to modernize the empire.

The key elements of Miliutin's reforms were :<sup>159</sup>

(1) Organization : Miliutin's most lasting reform was the creation of military districts incorporating all of the provinces of the empire. Before Miliutin, the Russian army, in terms of its organizational redundancies and structural defects, had been one of the most backward institutions in the Imperial state. Under Miliutin's brilliant tutelage, the army and the War Ministry at one bound matched the most sophisticated of the empire's governmental agencies.

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<sup>158</sup> For example, Gen. M.I. Dragomirov argued as the head of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff from 1878 to 1889 and thereafter in countless articles and pamphlets that the decisive factor in warfare was morale, not technology. Furthermore, in strategy the dominant Gen. G.A. Leer overstressed that strategy -- in contrast to modern strategy like the use of railroads for movement -- was a fine art and all known strategic principles could be learned from an analysis of the campaigns of Republican Rome.

<sup>159</sup> Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, pp. 8-13.

(2) Education : To Miliutin, professionalism began with education. His goal had been to create a broadly educated, socially responsible officer corps, and to some extent he was successful. For example, the old cadet corps, that combination of primary and secondary school for future officers which had emphasized brutal discipline and automatic obedience, gave way to the military *gymnasium* staffed with civilian instructors. Furthermore, Miliutin regularized the old junker schools, and opened them and some of the military schools to the previously *bound* classes -- including the peasantry. Concern for improving standards among the rank-and-file officers was paralleled by a concern for transforming the officers of the General Staff into a true military elite. The vehicle of that transformation, once again, was education -- in this case substantive changes in the curriculum and status of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff. Miliutin's plan was to make the Staff Academy the school for the most intellectually able officers in the army, officers who were to be selected, if possible, without regard to social class or wealth. What Miliutin had done for the General Staff he replicated on a smaller scale for three other intellectually prestigious groups of officers : the lawyers -- Alexander Academy of Military Justice; the engineers -- Nicholas Engineering Academy; the artillerists -- Michael Artillery Academy.

(3) Universal Conscription Law : Miliutin's greatest achievement of all was doubtless the enactment of the universal conscription law of 4 January 1874. This conscription law was both an act of military reform and an act of social reform, since Miliutin hoped with its aid to drive the peasantry into school.

## 2. Military Professionalism, 1881-1914

The Miliutin period from 1863 to 1880 was a time of promise for the Russian army, and the Russian army had taken its first step towards professionalism. But after Miliutin was replaced by Alexander III the situation changed. The Miliutin reforms were revised in *toto*. The time from 1881 to World War I was characterized by low quality as well as low quantity of the personnel -- especially the officers and officer candidates.

In the Russian case, however, there were three distinctive reasons why the officer's career lost its attractiveness:<sup>160</sup>

- (1) the antiprogressive spirit of the military counterreforms;
- (2) the low pay of Russian officers;
- (3) the redeployment of 45 percent of the army in miserable little hamlets in the western military districts to counterbalance Germany's alarming superiority in mobilization speed.

With regard to a sense of group identity, the third point of Fuller's definition of military professionalism, the notorious disunity of the Russian officer corps, militated against a highly articulated corporate spirit. Unlike English and Prussian officers, Russian officers were not cut from the same mold. In contrast, the Russian army contained a hierarchy of subservices. There was no corporate spirit of the officer corps but rather a cast espirit : Imperial Suite -- the most exclusive organization -- 150 officers attached directly to the Emperor; Imperial Guards; Cossacks; Cavalry; Infantry. There were vast differences in the status, career prospects, and privileges of the various subservices of the tsarist army. The Imperial government was alive to the disunity of tsarist officers and developed two strategies for overcoming it:<sup>161</sup>

- (1) the Officers' Clubs : this strategy failed because the new officers' clubs were organized by service and unit -- and hence did nothing to bridge the gaps of disunity.
- (2) the Code of Honor : this strategy failed also and became the reason for an negative corporate spirit -- duty to defend the officers' honor, duels, growing confrontation of military and society.

In summary, the Russian officers -- in contrast to the German officer corps -- lacked the cohesion to pursue a program of corporate interests or even to develop such a program. The disunity of the Russian officers, then, contributed to their failure to satisfy

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p. 14-15.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., pp. 22-24.

the fourth condition of professionalism : the recognition and articulation of innate military interests.

Fuller comes to the conclusion that the Russian tsarist officer corps at the beginning of World War I in 1914 was not very professional or military professionalism simply did not exist. All great nations had problems to realize the process towards professional armed forces -- no doubt about it -- but if we rank the great European armies in terms of their professionalism, then, the German army would head the list, while the Russian would come near the bottom.

### **3. Civil-Military Conflict**

In late Imperial Russia civil-military conflict was a reality and a result of the attempt of the Russian Army to develop a professional Russian officer corps. The autocracy was unready to grant the army more autonomy, since military autonomy was itself a contradiction of the autocratic principle. Civil-military conflict was the unavoidable result, and this conflict was dysfunctional because it damaged the combat readiness of the army.

The Russian army did contain a leaven of self-conscious military professionalism. But the War Ministry itself became imbued with the new professional spirit from 1880 to 1905 because in this period the graduates of Miliutin's reformed academies came to dominate key institutions within the Ministry. The estimate of the situation in the Russian War Ministry was determined by two great challenges in this time. First, the power of the German Reich in the West. Second, Russia's own military weakness because of technological backwardness.

The War Ministry's devotion to its own vested interests deepened in response to its conflict with the other governmental ministries. And the number of such conflicts increased in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century as the political power of the War Ministry declined.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, pp. 38.

Fuller analyses as one of the factors instrumental to the decline of the War Ministry the attitudes and values of Russia's last two autocrats : Alexander III and Nicholas II.<sup>163</sup> There were two styles of civil-military confrontation in the late Imperial Russia -- negative corporatist and professionalism. The first is best typified by clashes between officers and civilians over questions of *honor*, or perceived antimilitary bias. The second is best illustrated by conflicts between military officials and civilian bureaucrats or courtiers over the interests and purpose of the army. To a great extent negative corporativism was the antithesis of pure military professionalism. But ideal military professionalism did not exist in Russia at this time. Professionalism and negative corporatism could and did coexist in the mind of Russian officers. The majority of officers were unprofessional in terms of Fuller's definition as late as 1910. Both professionalism and negative corporatism became more intense in the tsarist officer corps from 1881 to 1914. Both stimulated civil-military conflict, which also grew more serious during this period.

Arising in the early years of the reign of Alexander III, civil-military conflict grew in intensity throughout the nineties, was exacerbated by the multiple traumas of 1904 to 1907, and attained vast proportions during the constitutional period. The tsarist regime, which had so often underwritten the interests of the army in the past, largely reduced its support for these interests from 1881 to 1914.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Fuller, pp. 38-41. Fuller describes Alexander III and Nicholas II as follows :

Alexander III -- cool to the army; one of the few who had actually held field command in time of war (Turkish War); *Peacegiver* with the intention to take all measures to escape the horrors of war; his statement was that Russia really has only two trustworthy allies -- her army and her fleet, but he never totally trusted his military men; another character with affected his relationship to the military was his famed intolerance for ceremonial and ritual; he definitely preferred family life to the world of the parade ground; he felt attachment to those officers who had been under his direct command in the Turkish War.

Nicholas II -- military enthusiast; served in several Guards regiments and participated in military maneuvers; he regarded himself as a soldier -- the first soldier in his Empire; but from the point of view of the War Ministry and General Staff the interest and influence of Nicholas II was very negative; Nicholas's notorious vacillation and weakness of will were just as detrimental to military interests as his defective understanding of the army. He was quite capable of changing his mind and his policy from year to year, month to month, week to week. Nicholas II was more interested in the Russian army than his father had been; but the army was not his principal concern. Nicholas could be convinced, he could be coaxed, he could be bullied. The other ministers had plenty of opportunity to sell their programs and viewpoints. The War Ministry accordingly was obliged to wrestle with the other ministries in order to propagate its ideas and interests.

<sup>164</sup> Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, p. 259.

At the prodding of the Ministry of Finance, the Imperial government pursued a course of economic and industrial modernization in the nineties. In the opinion of the army's leadership, this led to budgetary allocations which gravely underfunded the military. Towards the end of the nineties, confronted by burgeoning challenges to its authority from the intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the working masses, the autocracy responded by employing the army to check and crush internal unrest on an ever increasing scale. The revolution of 1905 started a period of hysteria and bloodshed that provided the greatest challenge the Russian Empire had known until World War I, the army did in fact save the Imperial government from collapse.<sup>165</sup>

During the 1905-1907 revolution, the regime dispatched troops not only to suppress disorders, but also to deter them through the intimidating presence of military guard details. ... The Ministry of War, however, accepted neither the erosion of its financial position nor its expanding repressive obligations.<sup>166</sup>

But the real heart of civil-military conflict in Imperial Russia inhered in the clashes between the autocracy, the civilian ministries, and the Ministry of War about the purpose of the army. Civilian ministers tended to regard the army as a resource on which they could draw. "Russia's increasingly professional military leaders, however, more and more adhered to the view that the army had one purpose and one purpose only : training for war."<sup>167</sup> These attitudes were founded in the beginning and development of military professionalism which in Russia grew steadily stronger between 1881 and 1914. But the total leavening of professionalism within the Russian officer corps remained small, and the War Ministry could not establish a professional officer corps by decree. There were too many structural problems, derived from Russia's political, economic, and social backwardness, which militated against professionalism.

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 259.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p. 260.

In fact, in Imperial Russia military professionalism and civil-military conflict fueled each other. The more professional the military elite became, the more vigorously it pushed for the modernization of the military arsenal and the creation of a truly national, patriotic army. Conversely, the more the autocrats and civilian bureaucrats frustrated these goals, the more firmly officers adhered to their professional program.<sup>168</sup>

There was, of course, no military coup in Russia during this period of Imperial Russia from 1861 until 1917. However, as it has often and correctly been pointed out, the abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917 can in part be construed as a military coup. Nicholas decided to renounce his power only after almost all of his front commanders had urged him to do so.<sup>169</sup> Many explanations of the abdication tend to concentrate on the army's frustrations at the mismanagement of the war. Fuller argues, in contrast, that the officers' resentment against civilian treatment of the army had a pre-history which long antedated August 1914. In summary, civil-military conflict of the variety which emerged in late Imperial Russia was dysfunctional.

This was not only because the tension underlying the conflict contributed to the downfall of the Romanov dynasty, but also because the energies squandered on this conflict could have been productively expended in the solution of other problems. ...

An expansion in military professionalism was, of course, a feature of other European armies. But the Russian military professionals were almost unique in their lack of prestige and lack of natural allies. Unlike the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, the Russian army had no role as an agency for the resolution or the suppression of nationalism. Unlike the German officer corps, the Russian officer corps enjoyed low prestige and was popularly reviled by the educated classes. Unlike the French army, the Russian army could rely on little political support either from the left or from the right, ...

By the summer of 1914 the relations between army and Duma, army and autocrat, and army and bureaucracy were characterized by mistrust and suspicion, which did not bode well for the conduct of the war effort.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p. 262.

Fuller argues that, contrary to what has often been said of it, the cream of the officer corps in Imperial Russia was politicized. But the capital weakness of the politics of this military elite was superficiality. Imperial Russian military politics was interest group politics. "The politicized officers were lobbyists, not statemen."<sup>171</sup> Numerous officers of Imperial Russia who joined the Whites were new professionals and in fact politicized. But their politics were narrow and consequently flawed. The White movement did not have a unified political ideology. Mere opposition to Bolshevism was too barren a program to unify soldiers, politicians, and population. So, too, was a concern for the preservation of the army. Fuller comes to the following conclusion :

The real problem which military professionals confronted in late Imperial Russia was the inability of the regime to find a place for them. The tsarist government was unable ... to generate institutions which could mediate between bureaucracy and army. Further, the autocracy was also unready to grant the army more autonomy, since military autonomy was itself a contradiction of the autocratic principle. Civil-military conflict was the unavoidable result.<sup>172</sup>

## B. SOVIET UNION

The society of the Soviet Union was militarized, and civil-military relations were dominated by the party-state system until 1991.

In 1917 Vladimir I. Lenin destroyed the Provisional Government's control of the military while winning the loyalty of some military units deployed in the capital. Without this success the communist revolution in Russia never could have happened.<sup>173</sup> Later the removal of Leo D. Trotsky from the Red Army command was an important step in Joseph W. Stalin's campaign against his archenemy.

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<sup>171</sup> Ibid., p. 263.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., p. 263.

<sup>173</sup> Tsyplkin, Mikhail, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1992, p. 43.

Stalin, who jealously guarded his power against any personal or institutional challenges, made a special effort, through a mixture of terror and privileges, to ensure the military's political quiescence. No other government branch was purged as thoroughly or urgently as the Red Army during the Great Terror -- probably because Stalin saw the military as the greatest potential threat to his personal power in any crisis; once the military was purged, Stalin felt free to unleash unlimited terror against the whole society.<sup>174</sup>

After Stalin, the communist party with its enormous bureaucracy controlled the military effectively until the middle of 1990, when the Communist Party was no longer the main political force in the Soviet Union. With the failed *August Coup* in 1991 it became obvious that the Communist Party had lost the power.

A military coup in the Soviet Union was unlikely because there was no tradition of successful military coups in Russian / Soviet history. "It is equally established in the Russian / Soviet tradition, however, that whenever the civilian authority is weakened by a succession of crisis or by a revolutionary upheaval, no government can survive without controlling the military or receiving its political support."<sup>175</sup>

The Russian writer Yurii Boriev compared in 1990 the history of the Soviet Union to a train in motion.

The train is speeding into a luminous future. Lenin is at the control. Suddenly -- stop, the tracks come to an end. Lenin calls on the people for additional, Saturday work, tracks are laid down, and the train moves on. Now Stalin is driving it. Again the tracks end. Stalin orders half the conductors and passengers shot, and the rest he forces to lay down new tracks. The train starts again. Krushchev replaces Stalin, and when the tracks come to an end, he orders that the ones over which the train has already passed be dismantled and laid down before the locomotive. Brezhnev takes Krushchev's place. When the tracks end again, Brezhnev decides to pull down the window blinds and rock the cars in such a way that the passengers will think the train is still moving forward.<sup>176</sup>

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., pp. 42-43.

<sup>176</sup> Boriev, Yurii, quoted by Kapuscinski, Ryszard, Imperium, New York : Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1994, p. 308.

And thus the Soviet Union came to the Epoch of the Brezhnev's, Andropov's, Chernenko's, during which the passengers of the train do not even have the illusion that they are going anywhere.

But then, in April 1985, the train starts to move again. This is its last journey, however. It will last six and a half years. This time Gorbachev is the engineer, and the slogan GLASNOST -- PERESTROIKA is painted on the locomotive.<sup>177</sup>

The crisis of the Communist system -- and concomitantly of the Soviet Union -- became increasingly profound, clear, and sharp in 1985. Communist parties in Western countries collapse and lose their meaning. Poland's Solidarity, despite the repressive power of martial law, creates a permanent and widening breach within an actual Socialist system. Moscow, increasingly falls behind in the arms race with the West, lags more and more visibly with its outdated technology and low labor productivity, loses position after position in the game to control the world.<sup>178</sup>

In such a situation, in March 1985, on Andrey Gromyko's recommendation, Mikhail Gorbachev became secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "In some sense perestroika and glasnost are the artificial lungs hooked up to the increasingly enfeebled, dying organism of the USSR. Thanks to them, the USSR will survive for another six and a half years."<sup>179</sup>

The foundation of the Soviet Imperium was terror and fear. "Because the Kremlin abandons the politics of mass terror with the death of Stalin and Beria, one can say that their departure is the beginning of the end of the Imperium."<sup>180</sup>

After five years of great effort and tension, Gorbachev was increasingly fatigued, disoriented, and nervous. He lost his initiative and dynamism, and his politics, until 1990 so creative and, given Russian circumstances, so innovative and extraordinary, became routine, indecisive, concessionary.

<sup>177</sup> Kapuscinski, p. 308.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 312.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 313-314.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p. 314.

In December 1990, his minister of international affairs and a tried-and-true ally, Eduard Shevardnadze, warns publicly that the country's conservative forces are preparing a coup d'état and offers his resignation. Gorbachev doesn't react.<sup>181</sup>

Then the critical year 1991 arrived. On 19 August 1991, a three-day coup began. The coup failed and Gorbachev returned from the Crimea. But no one listened to Gorbachev any longer; he had ceased to interest people.

Gorbachev must feel increasingly alone. He is still enormously popular in the West. The West would like to live in harmony with the rulers of the Kremlin, but it has one condition -- that they be likable, that they smile, that they be well dressed, relaxed, cheerful, humorous, courteous. And now, after six hundred years of hopeless waiting, such a man appears : Gorbachev ! London and Paris, Washington and Bonn, all open wide their arms, rejoice. What a discovery ! What a relief !<sup>182</sup>

After the *August coup* Gorbachev resigned as secretary-general of the CPSU. The center of power had moved to the president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin. On his initiative the resolution came to create a new union -- the Commonwealth of Independent States. On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR. The red flag with the hammer and sickle was removed from the Kremlin. The USSR had ceased to exist.

## 1. The Party-State System

The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party in communist political systems vary from one country to another. Perlmutter describes these civil-military relations as (1) *coalitional*, (2) *symbiotic*, (3) or *fused*.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid., p. 316.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p. 318.

<sup>183</sup> Perlmutter, Amos and LeoGrande, William M., "The Party in Uniform : Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems," American Political Science Review 74:4, 1982, p. 778.

The relations are dynamic, and the role of the military in politics is complex and variegated; "on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of *normal politics*, the military act as a functionally specified elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents."<sup>184</sup>

No communist system could have been established without resort to the armed forces, but these regimes do not live by force alone. Once a communist state has been established, the pattern of regime development depends upon the relationship among party, armed forces, and state, the *iron triangle* of communist systems, and the practice of politics is essentially bureaucratic in the sense that political conflicts are resolved within the confines of hierarchically organized structures.

A particular communist system has two characteristics.<sup>185</sup> First, in the economy, private enterprise is subordinated to state property and central planning. Second, in the polity, all political and administrative structures are subordinated to a hegemonic party. The extent of party hegemony depends upon how successfully the party exerts control over nonparty institutions.

There are two clear examples of how complex, fluid, and potentially unstable the autonomy-subordination relationship in communist systems is : (1) the state-party relations; (2) the civil-military relations. All in all, the fundamental structural feature of communist systems is the party-state.

## 2. The Military in the Party-State

Perlmutter describes and compares three more permanent, structural facets of the relationship.<sup>186</sup> At the *ideological level* the military, like all political structures, is constitutionally subordinate to the party. At the *microlevel of politics* party and military elites are among the most integrated elites in the party. The *systemic level of politics*

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 788.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., pp. 779 and 786.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., pp. 781-786.

concerns the the functional relationship among bureaucratic structures. Then Perlmutter describes, for analytic purposes, three basic ideal types of army-party relationships :

(1) A coalitional relationship (**Soviet Union**) is one of mutual benefit for the partners, a combination facing internal and external adversaries. It is a political relationship in which the participants maintain relative equality and independence from one another. The Soviet Armed Forces never aspired either to rule, to subordinate the party, or to act as the regime's praetorian guard. The relationship in the USSR changed dynamically from dependency to symbiosis and coalition, and in the last period to the professional soldier. But the party was the Soviet sovereign, and the military may have challenged the party elite or parts of it but never the party itself.

(2) A symbiotic relationship (**China**) is more organic than a coalitional one, because it is a system of living together, a partnership involving one another, and is associated with the survival of each institutional structure. The symbiotic relationship is characterized by low level of differentiation between military and nonmilitary elites, and the circulation of elites between military and nonmilitary posts. But the more professional the military becomes and the more sophisticated its technology, the more likely it is that the relationship will evolve away from symbiosis toward coalition.

(3) A fused relationship (**Cuba**). Cuba had the first successful socialist revolution without a Leninist party. The collapse of the Batista regime in 1959 was brought about by a guerrilla army, and the 26<sup>th</sup> July Movement, headed by Fidel Castro, was in no sense a party. In contrast, through the first six years of Cuban revolutionary government, the guerrilla army, transformed into the Revolutionary Armed Forces, acted as both party and army. The fundamental difference between China and Cuba in this period was the existence in China of a Marxist-Leninist party capable of directing the political system after the seizure of power. Therefore, the legacy of guerrilla war in China was symbiosis, and in Cuba it was fusion.

### 3. Civil-Military Conflict

The specific details of civil-military relations in any communist political system naturally depend upon the specific historical circumstances under which the revolutionary elite seize power.<sup>187</sup> But in all cases, the party plays the leading role in society. The party-army relationship in a communist system has the following relatively constant characteristics : a party-dominant authority structure, a high level of elite integration, and a complex institutional relationship that combines elements of both subordination and autonomy. The most distinctive characteristic of civil-military relations is the role assumed by the military during severe factional conflict within the party itself.

But even when the military *intervenes* in such factional conflicts, it intervenes on behalf of the party . . . In times of crisis, the officers may well be the most strategic faction of the political elite, but they are still party man.<sup>188</sup>

**To recapitulate**, this chapter focused on civil-military relations in Russian history from late Imperial Russia until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is important to keep in mind two main aspects from the analysis of Russian history before analyzing the Russian Federation / Russia today.

- (1) The military in Russian / Soviet history never took power for itself.
- (2) The development during the last months of the Soviet Union defy the theories of civil-military relations because the authors focus on the interaction of two actors, the Communist Party and the military.

By the middle of 1990, however, the Communist Party was no longer *the* political force in the Soviet Union. New and suddenly powerful political forces were beginning to define the civil-military relations in the disintegrating empire, leaving Western social science behind : for example, the recent study of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union . . . paid little attention to ethnic issues.<sup>189</sup>

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., pp. 786-788.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p. 788.

<sup>189</sup> Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?", p. 39.



## **VI. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - R U S S I A N F E D E R A T I O N / R U S S I A**

The following chapter is very complex and touches on many important issues. For example, domestic policy, constitutional and governmental aspects, foreign and security policy, budget crises and economy, ethnic problems, military, history, and the interaction of these issues are all important concerning the analysis of democratization and problems of civil-military relations in Russia.

But in this study it is not possible to analyse all of these relevant aspects in detail; therefore, this chapter analyses civil-military relations and its problems in the Russian Federation / Russia during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union by focusing on two selected issues : (A.) Russian Foreign and Security Policy; (B.) the Russian Armed Forces in State and Society.

Why focusing on foreign and security policy as well as on armed forces in state in society ? The answer depends on two additional questions.

First, what is the national interest of Russia ? The national foreign and security policy is only one aspect in the analysis of civil-military relations -- but a key aspect.

The ordering of its civil-military relations ... is basic to a nation's military security policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.<sup>190</sup>

Second, what's going on with the Russian military ? The Russian military wields the power to defend the process of democratization and also has the power to stop this process.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation / Russia is divided into three stages. First, the period of the destruction of the old Soviet system. Second, the period of transition toward democracy. Third, the period of consolidation of the new order.

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<sup>190</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 2.

O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that "... the transition is over when *abnormality* is no longer the central feature of political life ..." <sup>191</sup> They define the first open elections as the end of transition to democracy. By using this minimal-definition, Russia's transition toward democracy was successful. Since 1993 there have been two open elections in Russia. Furthermore, the constitution of the Russian Federation defines Russia as a democracy in which human and civil rights are protected by the state as the supreme values.

**Art. 1.** - 1. The Russian Federation / Russia is a democratic and federal state based on the rule of law, with a republican form of government. 2. The names Russian Federation and Russia are equivalent.

**Art. 2.** - Human beings and their rights and liberties are the supreme values. The recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and liberties is the obligation of the state.<sup>192</sup>

However, Linz and Stepan define a consolidated democracy as a political situation in which democracy has become behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally *the only game in town*.<sup>193</sup> By using this definition, present Russia is neither a democracy nor a consolidated democracy. By contrast, Russia can be described as a *paper democracy* because democracy as *the only game in town* is existing only on the paper of the

<sup>191</sup> O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C., Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, Fourth Impression, 1993, p. 65.

<sup>192</sup> The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, "Russia's Parliamentary Elections 1993 and 1995. Includes the text of the 1993 Russian Constitution," Columbus, Ohio, 1996, p. 40.

<sup>193</sup> Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 5-6.

(1) Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.

(2) Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.

(3) Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.

constitution. Russia finds itself currently in a situation in which elements of the old system still mingle with the forerunners of the new order. This process seems extremely difficult, and there is no guarantee of success for democracy.

Why is the process of democratization so difficult in Russia ? In the Russian Federation / Russia today most of the problems concerning transition, development and consolidation of democracy are not solved, and too much still remains of the old system, of the former Soviet Union :<sup>194</sup>

- (1) the old nomenclature -- the governmental, economic, military, and police bureaucracy;
- (2) several important armed forces -- Border Troops, Internal Troops, Russian Armed Forces (Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, Ground Forces), Civil Defense Troops, Railroad Troops and Construction Troops, Cossacks;
- (3) the security and intelligence establishment within the Ministry of Interior and parts of the powerful KGB which have survived;
- (4) all of middle and heavy industry is still in the hand of the state;
- (5) the state is still dominant as landowner;
- (6) the whole sphere of old habits of thought, of social behavior, and of benighted views that had been inculcated into people for decades;
- (7) the old legal system;
- (8) the awareness of the terror and repression, of the persecutions that began in 1917 and that lasted for decades, assuming in certain years the character of mass extermination;
- (9) the universal poverty of this society, the poverty of apartments, the poverty of the kitchen, the poverty of life;
- (10) the staggering demoralization of significant portions of society -- the growth of all types of gangs, the terror exercised by armed bands. In addition, the ubiquitous presence of the most diverse mafias, reaching as far as the highest rungs of power. The active and impudent black market in weapons, including missiles. The defiant

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<sup>194</sup> Kapuscinski, Ryszard, Imperium, New York : Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1994, pp. 324-325.

and terrifying thievery. Epidemic corruption. Alcoholism, rape, cynicism, as well as omnipresent, common churlishness;

(11) the ecological depredations including nuclear-waste dumps;

(12) and last but not least the enormous ethnic problems and armed conflicts inside Russia as well as along the frontiers of the Russian Federation.

## A. RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The *foreign policy* of a state defines in the broadest sense the major tasks for its military.<sup>195</sup> But Russian foreign policy has hardly been consistent in the last years, evolving as it was under the constraints of many factors, internal and external, but it shows distinct shifts and trends.

The discussion concerning the Russian way today and in future is divided into a more *pessimistic camp*<sup>196</sup> and a more *optimistic camp*.<sup>197</sup> The more *pessimistic camp* argues that Russia's shift toward a foreign policy of the "near abroad" brings Russia back to imperialism and empire-building -- to restore as much as possible of the former Soviet Union. This camp considers that Russian foreign policy became more aggressive and the Russian military doctrine became more offensive in 1993. Russia could move again toward a kind of totalitarianism and hegemony or anarchy. The more *optimistic camp* argues that Russia seems for the first time in its history to have a real opportunity of becoming a democratic, prosperous, cooperative member of the international community.

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<sup>195</sup> Odom, William E. and Dujarric, Robert, Commonwealth or Empire ? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, Indianapolis; Indiana : Hudson Institute, 1995, p. 114.

<sup>196</sup> Examples for the more pessimistic camp are, e.g., Odom and Dujarric; Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia. Ten Myths that Shape the Image, Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 1996; Richard F. Staar, "Moscow's Plan to Restore Its Power. Beyond the Unipolar Moment," Orbis, vol. 40, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 375-389.

<sup>197</sup> Examples for the more optimistic camp are, e.g., Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a 'great power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality," International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 33-68; Rodic Braitwaite, "Russian Realities and Western Politics," Survival, vol. 36, no 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 11-27;

The West naturally welcomed this prospect without reserve, in the native belief that the new Russia could be transformed almost overnight into a democratic, loyal, and above all unquestioning, supporter of Western policy. That naive euphoria, that belief in the mutation of history, had been replaced by a growing unease, both within Russia and outside.<sup>198</sup>

Russia's present situation is a very dangerous and explosive mixture of different factors. The political situation of Russia is intricate and unstable in domestic policy as well as in foreign policy. Solid information and insights about what is really going on have been hard to come by. President Boris Yeltsin is a sick man, and doubts arise over who's really in charge in Russia. The development of the economy -- a keystone in the process to establish and consolidate a viable democracy -- isn't very successful. Government and economy are influenced by three major lobbies.

As significant lobbying groups must, the fuel and power complex, the military-industrial complex and the agro-industrial complex have representatives in federal bodies of power, in the provinces, in financial and banking circles, in the political parties, in the trade unions and in the news media. Basically, they have their people everywhere.<sup>199</sup>

Initially, the Yeltsin government had to develop two foreign policies, one for the "far abroad" (the remainder of the world), the other for the "near abroad" (the former USSR).

The Russian policy toward the "far abroad" has three axis :

- (1) West (Europe and North America);
- (2) South (the subcontinent and the Middle East);
- (3) East (East Asia).

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<sup>198</sup> Braithwaite, pp. 11-12.

<sup>199</sup> Vyzhutovich, Valery, "How Three Major Lobbies Influence Government," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLVI, no. 50 (1994), p. 19.

In 1992 and 1993, Yeltsin's foreign policy on the West axis not only maintained but even expanded the cooperative approach of the last three years of the Gorbachev period. On the South axis, Russia was neither uncooperative with the United States nor very active. On the East axis, Yeltsin tried to follow up on the breakthroughs of Gorbachev's policy, beginning with a rapprochement with China, expanded ties with South Korea, and improved relations with Japan.

In the late 1993, Russian foreign policy shifted from its initial status quo orientation, aimed at doing nothing to reserve the loss of Moscow's control over the former Soviet republics, to a careful but assertive policy on the South axis, aimed at reestablishing Moscow's hegemony based both on formal arrangements within the CIS and on the physical presence of Russian military in as many of the CIS members as possible. "As Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, took a much harder line toward Russia's "near abroad," Moscow seemed to have reached a de facto consensus on restoring as much of the old Soviet empire as possible under the banner of the CIS."<sup>200</sup> The centre of gravity in Russia's foreign policy shifted from the "far abroad" to the "near abroad" and is still there. "In the spring and fall of 1993, President Boris Yeltsin adopted an *assertive* foreign policy concept and a military doctrine that appeared to define Russia's periphery not only as the zone of Russian vital national interests but also as the possible area for Russian unilateral military interventions."<sup>201</sup>

On the one hand, Russia's long-range military doctrine could become more aggressive, and Russia's military strategy could become more offensive. Russia's conventional armed forces are weak. Especially the experiences of the Chechen War have underlined the wicked condition of the Russian armed forces. But Russia is still a strong nuclear power. On the other hand, Russia needs help to be successful in the process of democratization.

<sup>200</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 98.

<sup>201</sup> Tsyplkin, Mikhail, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," in Bruce Parrott (editor), State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Armonk, New York and London : M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p. 11.

Another influence of foreign policy on democratic transition and consolidation concerns what we might call *gate opening to democratic efforts*. ...a regional hegemon may, by a consistent policy package of meaningful incentives and disincentives, play a major supportive ... role in helping a fledgling democracy in the region complete a democratic transition and consolidate democracy.<sup>202</sup>

Rodic Braitwaite underlines three important aspects :

- (1) A first step is to treat Russia as a major power, an equal member in good standing of the international community : Yeltsin's demand, as it was the demand of Peter the Great.
- (2) The Russians must of course accept the independence of countries of the former Soviet Union. It is a fact, not a threat, that any violation of that independence would bring about a most serious deterioration in Russia's relations with the West. But the West has also to accept that Russia has a legitimate interest in the preservation of peace on their borders and that the presence of large Russian minorities in many of those countries given rise to objective problems which have nothing to do with neo-imperialism.
- (3) The West must support as best it can the process of economic reform inside Russia itself. But perhaps the most useful thing the outside world can do is to help Russia remain open.<sup>203</sup>

Since Peter the Great Russia has usually been feared, if not always respected, by its neighbors, and whether Russians like it or not, Russia is, and will remain, a great European power. To bring Russia into a fruitful and cooperative relationship with the rest of the modern world is surely the greatest prize for Russian and Western politicians alike. "To despair, to fall back into the attitudes of the past -- whether those of the Cold War or those of the nineteenth century -- would be a negation of statemanship."<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Linz and Stepan, pp. 73-74.

One example is the collective foreign policy of the European Economic Community and especially of the Federal Republic of Germany toward Portugal in 1974.

<sup>203</sup> Braitwaite, pp. 25-26.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, p. 24.

But Russia must accept the *rules of the game* to get this international support -- peace, democracy, and human rights. A Russian foreign policy with the intention to restore the former Soviet Union, a more aggressive Russian military doctrine as well as a more offensive military strategy are a violation of these *rules of the game*.

### **1. Russia and the "far abroad"**

Sergei Blagovolin, formerly a professor at the Institute for International Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), offered in 1993 a foreign policy toward the "far abroad."<sup>205</sup> He focused first on the many political and economic processes at work in the rest of the world, particularly the world economy, the European Community, NATO, technological change, and the transnational social and cultural forces giving the West a distinctive and attractive character. His intention was to counter the opinion still dominant in Russian military and reactionary political circles; therefore, he took pains to explain why liberal democracies, owing to their internal constraints, could not pose serious offensive military threats to Russia.

Blagovolin reviewed the three axes for Russian policy within this larger international context. In his analysis the West axis took priority, and his goal there was to see Russia become part of the Western economic, political and cultural community.

Only by succeeding with its domestic transformation to a liberal political and economic system could Russia hope to join that community. In Blagovolin's view a great power status would naturally arise through a cooperative relationship with the United States. If the United States takes an appropriate leading role in these regions it will need Russia as a key partner because both states are deeply involved in Europe and Asia. "No other state can join the United States in balancing the two key areas of the world ... thus Russia's status is not threatened but rather ensured by aligning with the West."<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 119.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

Blagovolin warned Russians against the temptation to try to split Europe from the United States, because such a move would destroy the very community Russia must join in order to become a modern and prosperous liberal society. He treated the disintegration of the West as Russia's greatest external threat, an eventuality that would leave Russia alone, outside a stable international system. Concerning Russia's "near abroad," Blagovolin judged the maintenance of stability -- especially in Eastern Europe -- as beyond Russia's means, and he welcomed the entry of Eastern European states into NATO.

But in his opinion the CIS States (including Russia) should not join NATO because they do not yet have the domestic political conditions or professional militaries to participate effectively. He also believed that all should strive for expanded security relations with NATO and dependency on the Western security system, within NATO as the system's foundation, not the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). "Within the CIS ... no state other than Russia had adequate military power to play a stabilizing role, but the CIS should not try to become another NATO; CIS members simply do not share enough in common to make such an alliance work."<sup>207</sup> In Blagovolin's view the "far abroad" was more important to Russia's security than the "near abroad." "The road to Russian security lead through Washington and Bonn (Berlin), not through Dushanbe, Tashkent, and Tbilisi."<sup>208</sup>

## **2. Russia and the "near abroad"**

Alexander Rutskoi as well as Vladimir Zhirinovsky opened the way to this policy. Both old communists and new Russian nationalist-patriotic spokesmen shared their opinions and offered demagogic rhetoric if not clear policy concepts in support of the policy of "near abroad."

Vice-President Rutskoi was the highest-level spokesman for this position in 1993. He argued that no serious military threats to Russia existed, but he insisted that military affairs are dynamic, that a few states are acquiring greater military potential, including

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

nuclear weapons, and that the present peaceful state of affairs could be short-lived. "For Russia specifically ... the large "possible threat" would be the movement of military forces into states on the CIS boarder. Other and more immediate threats were civil wars within the CIS, including Russia."<sup>209</sup>

In Rutskoi's view the potential adversaries were the United States, Western Europe, and China, since only they could possibly move large forces into Eastern Europe or along the CIS boarders in the East. He also mentioned possible rearmament by Japan.

Notwithstanding the potential for adversarial relations with these states, he prescribed expanded relations and policies of cooperation with them all. ... When he voiced concern about states' acquiring greater military potential, including nuclear weapons, that could pose a threat to Russian territory, he might well have had in mind other CIS states, including Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as well as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.<sup>210</sup>

The primary focus of Rutskoi's policy were the former Soviet republics. According to him, the CIS and the Baltic states must be a single strategic space, tied firmly in a collective security system and supported by a military development program through the year 2000. First, he proposed for Russian foreign policy a thinly veiled formula for reclaiming the old Soviet borders as well as Russian "great power" status on all three axes. Second, Rutskoi encouraged cautious cooperation with the West and Japan, and his position on practical matters like relations with former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic republics was to consider their inclusion in NATO wholly unacceptable, a direct threat to Russia. Third, cooperation with the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia was secondary to maintaining Russia's influence in these two regions.

This is not a status quo foreign policy. In contrast, it is a formula for regaining lost power and prestige, obviously requiring considerable Russian military policy. Furthermore, it seems to put foreign policy above domestic reforms as a priority. The important reason for not dismissing such foreign policy aims is that Rutskoi's arguments were "... effectively

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p. 118.

a summary of the strategic thinking within the defense ministry in 1992, thinking that persisted there and among conservative political circles in 1993 and 1994, and that may have been the basis for policies implemented in 1993-94.<sup>211</sup>

### **3. Selected Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy**

#### **NATO Enlargement**

Should NATO enlarge ? Freezing NATO into its Cold War configuration would itself be a huge mistake, a major setback both for the democratic nations that hope to join the alliance and for the alliance interest in supporting democratic institutions. "By contrast, enlarging NATO in a way that encourages European integration and enhances European security ... will be benefit all the people of the continent, and the larger transatlantic community as well."<sup>212</sup>

*When NATO approaches the borders of the Russian Federation, you can say that there will be two military blocs, and this will be a restoration of what we have already had.*<sup>213</sup>

There is no doubt about it that NATO's intention of enlargement is on a collision course with Russian intentions. First, in the four years since U.S. President Bill Clinton said that the question of expanding NATO is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how, the issue has become much more complex.<sup>214</sup> Second, other factors, such as Russia's shriller and more threatening opposition to the idea, are also raising concerns.

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>212</sup> Talbott, Strobe, "Why Nato Should Grow", in Kober, Stanley, "The United States and the Enlargement Debate," Transition, (CZ), 23 December 1995, p. 8.

<sup>213</sup> Boris Yeltsin, quoted by Kober, p. 10.

<sup>214</sup> Kober., p. 6.

*They want to take the countries of Eastern, Western, and Central Europe and stuff them with nuclear arms... . Will Russia permit this ? No and no again. Too many countries have taken measures to eliminate nuclear weapons. To deploy them again in Eastern and Central Europe would be madness.*<sup>215</sup>

Third, a few former members of the Soviet bloc are worried that admitting some countries into NATO might jeopardize the security of those remaining outside the organization. In its military negotiations and diplomacy with Europe and the United States, Russia was highly cooperative in 1992 and most of 1993. But by the winter of 1993-94 Moscow began to back away from its pattern of extensive cooperation, and Yeltsin and Kozyrev began to speak of Russian interests that would limit cooperation in the future. The Russian military managed to influence foreign policy to entangle Moscow in a new imperialism aimed at controlling Central Asia and the Transcaucasus at a minimum and, at a maximum, at bringing Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, and possibly the Baltic states back into a unified military and economic relationship with Moscow.<sup>216</sup> To the degree that the maximum goal is attained, Russia will also become more assertive in Eastern Europe. With an understanding of these dynamics and factors within Russia, more light can be shed on the issues of war and peace, stability and instability, in Central Asia, in the Transcaucasus, and in Eastern Europe. It also underlines the risk of NATO enlargement. But even if Russia did not accept the arrangement, Brzezinski, former U.S. national-security adviser, dismissed in February 1995 the possibility of an aggressive Russian response.

Threatened by the new Muslim states to the south and facing a possible future conflict in the east, today's Russia is in no position to engage also in a conflict with the West.... Moscow can perhaps delay somewhat the enlargement of NATO, but it can neither halt Europe's growth nor prevent the concomitant extension of the Euro-Atlantic security umbrella over the wider Europe. It can merely isolate itself again.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>215</sup> Boris Yeltsin, quoted by *ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>216</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 168.

<sup>217</sup> Kober, p. 9.

## Transcaucasus and Central Asia

In the Soviet era, both Turkey and Iran faced a Soviet monolith on their northern border. Neither country had influence in the Caucasus, and both sought to defend themselves against Soviet expansionism. But the appearance of three small republics on Turkey's and Iran's border transformed the local environment, leaving Turkey and Iran with weak neighbors to their north.

The post-Soviet situation in the Transcaucasus has potentially grave implications for both countries. Although at this time Russian hegemony seems guaranteed, and conflict between Turks and Iranians is unlikely, the potential for disorder and violence in the region remains.<sup>218</sup>

In the Soviet era, the Central Asian countries, as republics of the USSR, did not have independent international relations. "The Soviet state kept foreign influence out of Central Asia, restricting the interaction between Central Asians and foreigners."<sup>219</sup> Therefore, when the Central Asian republics attained independence, it was difficult to guess what their international posture would be. Some observers thought that the new Central Asia would reestablish ties to the Moslem world, possibly under the influence of radical Islamists. Others speculated that China's influence might move westward to encompass the new republics. Still others believed that a new Turkic community could arise from the Turkestan of old. By 1994, the outline of Central Asia's international relations had become clearer.

Russia remained the dominant power, with hegemony in military, political, and economic affairs. All other foreign countries were considerably less influential in the region, though all had seen their presence increase greatly since Soviet days.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 215.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p. 176.

The dropping of the Iron Curtain along the southern Soviet border exposed two regions on the periphery of that empire -- the Transcaucasus and Central Asia -- to neighboring regions with which they had long been close before Soviet rule. For example, the famous *Silk Road* between Europe and China had traversed Central Asia and brought the region cultural, economic, and political influence from the Orient. Also Persians and Turks fought over the Transcaucasus for centuries. The North Caucasus and the Black Sea figured in the 19th century *Great Game* of imperial competition between Great Britain and Russia. It seems that Central Asia and the Transcaucasus could come under a new Russian hegemony.

Despite Moscow's claim that it was acting as *peacemaker*, it was becoming obvious by 1994 that Russian military involvement has increased violence and sustained civil war in both regions. ... With the opening of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus to the outside world, the region's relations with countries to its south, from Turkey to China, became an issue. As eight new players joined the diplomatic game, new alignments throughout central Eurasia became possible. So far, however, no foreign actor has displaced Russia as the dominant influence on the region.<sup>221</sup>

### **East Asia**

Moscow's leaders recognize that international threats to Russia's security and well-being are minimal when compared to the acute domestic sources of instability. Unless the economy can be reformed and a stable democratic political system created, catastrophe looms.

Russian foreign policy is directed at securing the economic assistance from the outside world that the country so desperately needs. In regard to the Asia-Pacific region, this orientation leads to the following Russian goals :<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 256.

<sup>222</sup> Marantz, Paul, "Moscow and East Asia : New Realities and New Politics," in Sheldon W. Simon (editor), East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, New York : M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, pp. 32-33.

- (1) the sharp expansion of trade;
- (2) the procurement of credits, technology, and investment, especially from South Korea and Japan;
- (3) the use of trade and foreign investment to develop the Russian Far East so that separatist tendencies will not grow in this key region and so that Russian Far East will contribute to the process of economic rebirth throughout the country;
- (4) the elimination of perceptions in the region that Russian military might is a threat to other states;
- (5) the establishment of stable, cordial relations so that Russia will not become the target of hostile coalitions (e.g. Sino-Japanese alliance);
- (6) the preventing of North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, since this would encourage nuclear proliferation and might lead to extensive Japanese militarization.

## **B. RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN STATE AND SOCIETY**

The trauma and chaos induced in Russian military affairs by the breakup of the Soviet Union are difficult and exaggerate.

A proud and ideologically indoctrinated officer corps witnessed the rapid decline and disintegration of the Soviet military during Gorbachev's *perestroika* policy. ... In retrospect, it is puzzling that the officer corps sided with Yeltsin against Gorbachev as Yeltsin maneuvered in December 1991 to dissolve the Soviet Union.<sup>223</sup>

The Russian military saw the CIS as merely a new version of the Soviet Union, that is, as essentially a unified political entity with a unified military. By the spring of 1992, that illusion was destroyed.

During the last six years the generals became involved in domestic politics during the course of two violent upheavals. The first took place at the end of the Soviet Union in August 1991 (the *August Coup*), when flag officers in key positions refused to obey their

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<sup>223</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 166.

defense minister's orders. The second occurred in Russia in 1993 (*the October Mutiny*), when the high command initially made a collective decision to remain outside of politics in the midst of a mutiny to unseat the commander-in-chief. "The two attempts to seize power espoused similar objectives : to turn back the clock and restore the old USSR system within its former geographic boundaries."<sup>224</sup> Both military interventions failed, the *coup* in 1991 as well as the *mutiny* in 1993, and in both cases the military did not assume political power. Today it seems that the danger to democracy in Russia comes not from the threat of military coups, but from the possibility that the military may participate in coalitions with pro-communist or radical right political forces wanting to destabilize the status quo or the development of democratic structures.<sup>225</sup>

### **1. Russian Military Doctrine**

The term *military doctrine* is fairly loosely used in Western writings, and in Western parlance, it might better be translated as the state's *military security policy*. By contrast, in the Soviet Union it had a rigid definition. "Consisting of two components, social-political and military-technical, it was said to encompass the state's official view on war, military forces, and preparations of war."<sup>226</sup>

Because Marxism-Leninism split the world into two camps, socialist and capitalist-imperialist, the military doctrine effectively defined the threat against which Soviet forces had to prepare to fight -- essentially the entire nonsocialist world.

Soviet military doctrine, therefore, was designed for dealing with the inevitable showdown between socialism and capitalism. ... Military doctrine, conceived in such broad terms, embraced a large part of the entire business of governing within the Soviet state. Military doctrine in

<sup>224</sup> Staar, Richard F., The New Military in Russia. Ten Myths That Shape the Image, Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 1996, p. 14.

<sup>225</sup> Bernstein, Alvin H., "Civilian Control of the Military in a Democratic Society," Speech - Executive Level Seminar on Democratic Defense Planning and Budgeting, European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GE), 1996, p. 20.

<sup>226</sup> Odom and Dujarric, pp. 125-126.

this system was never written down in any formal document. Its authority derived from the ideology informing it and from its approval by the communist's highest organ, the Politbüro. ... Justification of its action to a parliamentary body or to the public was out of the question.<sup>227</sup>

During the post-Stalinist era, the Soviet military enjoyed considerable autonomy in the areas of force structure, manpower, and troop welfare. This very important review of what military doctrine has long meant to the present generation of Russian military leaders is essential to an understanding of their obsession with developing and legitimizing a new, Russian version of the doctrine. "They instinctively wanted it to perform all the functions of the old one -- defining the threat, justifying force structure, and dictating adequate resources."<sup>228</sup>

The current doctrine, signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 2 November 1993, has been described as a transitional document.

It proclaims that the Russian Federation ... does not regard any state as an enemy. However, the doctrine then proceeds to list ten potential sources of danger, such as local wars, especially those to Russian borders; discrimination against Russian citizens living abroad; and expansion of military alliances to the detriment of Russia's security.<sup>229</sup>

This doctrine mentions maintenance of stability in regions directly bordering on the Russian Federation as well as in the former Soviet satellites. Then the document asserts a sphere of influence that coincides with the one maintained by the USSR.

Russia's new armed forces were assigned three priority tasks through the end of this century. First, to establish mobile forces to conduct operations in any region where a threat may arise. Second, to provide security for other members of the CIS, possibly by deploying Russian troops on their territories. Third, to station troops outside of Russia,

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>229</sup> Staar, Richard F., "Moscow's Plan to Restore Its Power, Beyond the Unipolar Moment," *Orbis*, vol. 40, no. 3, 1996, p. 375.

either together with units of another state or as exclusively Russian formations at their own separate bases.

The 1993 doctrine also included a section on military-technical support for the armed forces with implementation of a long-range (10-15 years) program to develop new weapons and other military hardware, as well as to procure more and more advanced systems for the military.

No aspect of this doctrine had been unexpected in the West, and much in the doctrine, e.g., "Russia has no enemies," consisted of merely declaratory statements for Western consumption.

Nevertheless, the document gave the generals exactly what they wanted : a definition of domestic missions for the army, a statement on Russia's responsibilities in the "near abroad," and repudiation of the "no first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. ... The reversal in 1993 envisaged first use of such tactical or strategic warheads against other nuclear powers, their allies, and states not party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>230</sup>

Not surprisingly, this doctrine caused deep concern in the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics, e.g., President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan "... pointed out the unnerving analogy between Russia's claim to protect Russians in other CIS states and Hitler's assertion of authority over Sudeten Germans in 1938."<sup>231</sup>

A recent study, produced at the Institute for Defence Studies (Institut oboronykh issledovanii -- INOBIS) and reportedly commissioned by the Ministry of Defense, seems likely to become part of Russia's new long-range national security doctrine. The INOBIS report begins with a discussion of threats to national security, in descending order of magnitude. Note that in each case the West is said to be the source of the threat.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., p. 376-377.

<sup>231</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 130.

## INOBIS

### Threats to Russia's National Security<sup>232</sup>

(1) Interference in the internal affairs of Russia by the United States and its allies.

(2) Political and economic penetration of Azerbaijan by Turkey, the United States, Britain, and Germany, with Azerbaijan serving as a bridgehead for future Western expansion into Central Asia, the Volga region, and the Northern Caucasus through exploitation of "Turkic" and "Islamic" factors.

(3) Attempts to isolate and remove Russia from Europe through an expansion of NATO that admits, in stages :

- Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (within two or three years);
- Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Austria -- possibly also Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (by the year 2000); and
- Ukraine (probably in 2005).

Under no circumstances will Russia ever be accepted into NATO, because the two main proponents of expansion are Germany and the United States.

(4) Unilateral disarmament of Russia through :

- financing the degradation of Russian strategic weapons systems and R&D centers;
- attempting to force acceptance of unequal treaties like START II;
- demanding amendments to the anti-ballistic missile agreement in an atmosphere of "cold peace"; and
- counteracting integration within the CIS.

This study declares that if the Baltic states are invited to join NATO, Russian armed forces should immediately occupy Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, because their membership in NATO would represent no less a threat to Russia than Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba posed for the United States in 1962. Furthermore, this study includes recommended strategies to neutralize the threats to Russia's national security.

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<sup>232</sup> Quoted by Staar, "Moscow's Plan to Restore Its Power," pp. 378.

## INOBIS

### Recommended Strategies to Neutralize Threats to Russia's National Security<sup>233</sup>

- (1) to radically change economic relations by refusing to work with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank;
- (2) to review results from privatization of state property;
- (3) to prevent the West from exploiting Caspian Sea oil;
- (4) to block formation of territorial links between Turkey and Azerbaijan;
- (5) to stop the eastward expansion of NATO by establishing a military alliance of CIS members -- without Ukraine;
- (6) to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to :
  - the Western Theater of Military Operations (teatr voennyyk deistvii -- TVD) -- Belarus (where close bilateral military cooperation already exists), the Kaliningrad special region, and warships on the Baltic Sea;
  - the Northern TVD -- along the Norwegian boarder and on the Barents Sea; and
  - the Southern TVD -- at Russian bases in Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, Armenia, and on the Black Sea.

The INOBIS study argues that this strategy is similar to that adopted by NATO during the cold war, when tactical nuclear warheads were stored in Western Europe.

In the event of a complete rupture in NATO-Russian relations, Russia should sell nuclear and missile technology for military purposes to Iran, Iraq, and Algeria -- after radical Islamic forces have assumed control. Even a military alliance with Iran should not be excluded because the West would not be willing or able to repeat a Desert Storm operation once such weapons -- Russian troops with tactical nuclear weapons -- had been deployed in Iran.

<sup>233</sup> Quoted by ibid., p. 379.

In the first stage, the number of Russian strategic nuclear weapons should be confined within START I. But in the second stage (beginning in 2009) the number of these weapons must be expanded and modernized. Furthermore, INOBIS says, it is extremely important to counter the United States plans for a tactical ABM system and the American attempts to modify the 1972 treaty that would result in implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Such developments would affect not only Russia and China but also India and Pakistan -- all members of the nuclear-arms club. In this connection, Moscow may choose to deal with India in the same way that the United States treated Great Britain when the former provided Polaris and Trident missiles to carry British warheads.<sup>234</sup>

In the third stage (long-range view) such cooperation might also be extended by Russia to Iran and a number of other Muslim countries in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

These aspects of the INOBIS report represents official thinking, concluded from two events during February 1996. First, Viktor Mikhailov, the atomic energy minister and member of the Security Council, told reporters that Russia would destroy all sites for tactical nuclear weapons deployed by NATO in any East-Central European country. "Although no plans for such deployment exist, Mikhailov equated NATO eastward expansion with a policy of nuclear proliferation."<sup>235</sup> Second, Generals Dmitrii Kharchenko and Gennadii Ivanov, both advisors to Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev, told members of a Swedish military commission visiting Moscow that Russia would withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and slow down compliance with START I should Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states become members of NATO. *"There would be other unforeseeable consequences, namely that Russian nuclear weapons will be moved closer to the Nordic area and Central Europe."*<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p. 380.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., p. 380.

<sup>236</sup> Quoted by ibid., p. 380.

These threats may represent a form of blackmail, and Moscow may have no intention of following through and implementing them. However, in Richard Staar's really pessimistic view the INOBIS study seems likely to become part of Russia's new long-range national security doctrine.

## **2. Russian Military Strategy**

In this context military strategy means the use of military power in three cases.<sup>237</sup> First, the use of military power in wartime to defeat enemies. Second, the use of military power in peacetime to support diplomacy and strategic and conventional deterrence. Third, the use of military power generally to exert influence outside one's borders.

During the Soviet period, a complex array of warplans was developed and practiced. The European "Theaters of military operations" (TVDs) had priority, but the Far East and the Southern TVDs also received intensive attention. Four "groups of forces" in East Europe played the key role in warplans for an offensive into Western Europe. "Overall, Soviet warplans rested on the assumption that Soviet Union would seize the offensive in all theaters from the beginning of conflict."<sup>238</sup>

The new situation left the Russian military with virtually no implementable warplans other than hasty variants for the defense of Russian territory. Progress in developing new warplans confronted several difficulties in 1992-94.

As the defence ministry's preferences in foreign policy for the "near abroad" began to win support from the foreign minister in the summer of 1993, and with the formal promulgation in November 1993 of a new military doctrine stating Russia's strong interest in the ethnic-Russian population in other CIS republics and the Baltic states, an inchoate strategy became apparent. While a CIS armed forces had proven impractical to create, Russia did not give up on tying the CIS into a common military system.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>237</sup> Odom and Dujarric, p. 157.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 159.

There is no doubt about the evolution of Russian policy in the "near abroad," specifically the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and the increased role of the Russian military in many of the conflicts in these republics. "Within the *near abroad*, only the Baltic states were able to retain their independence from Russia and to remain outside the CIS."<sup>240</sup>

Beyond the territories of the former Soviet Union, Russia began to show its hand again Eastern Europe in the fall of 1993. After Yeltsin told Poland and the Czech Republic in July 1993 that Russia would not object to their joining NATO, he promptly reversed himself. Concerning NATO expansion, General Grachev declared that Poland was a military threat to Russia. As in January 1994 NATO summit meeting approached, and as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary lobbied hard for admittance to NATO, Moscow faced the prospect that indeed they might be admitted. "What role Moscow actually played in denying them membership is ambiguous. Several NATO states did not favor their admittance for reasons unrelated to Russia, but U.S. official statements included domestic Russian politics as a factor in rejecting them.

Whatever the facts, Russian hardliners could claim afterwards that Russian resistance had prevented NATO expansion and kept Eastern Europe open for greater Russian influence.<sup>241</sup> In the latter half of 1993 and early 1994, Russian strategy, using a mix of diplomacy, economic instruments, and military forces that had not been withdrawn from several of the CIS countries, was taking a new and offensive shape.

In its military negotiations and diplomacy with Europe and the United States, Russia was highly cooperative in 1992 and most of 1993. Russia contributed forces to UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia and was cooperative in the UN Security Council. But in the winter of 1993-94 Moscow began to back away from this pattern of extensive cooperation, and Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev began to speak of Russian interests that would limit cooperation in the future. "Yet given Russia's inherent weakness, there are limits on how far it can go in asserting such interests against strong Western

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., p. 162.

objections.<sup>242</sup> Today the Russian military strategy is reasonably coherent in some areas, filled with contradictions in others, and only partly developed in yet other.

Although military establishments are generally expected to support and help diplomats in carrying out foreign policy, the defense ministry effectively usurped the foreign ministry's role in Russian policy toward the CIS. After two years, defense ministry views were prevailing with Yeltsin, and the foreign ministry was piping a wholly different tune, giving the impression that a consensus had indeed been reached on foreign policy and the requisite military strategy to back it. This is the most important finding about Russian military strategy for assessing the prospects for stability and peaceful development ...<sup>243</sup>

### **3. Role and Mission of the Russian Armed Forces**

Beside the Russian foreign and security policy, military doctrine and military strategy, the problems of civil-military relations are obvious in the following four cases : Russian manpower policy, military-industrial policy, command, control, and force structure, and the Chechen War.

(1) Military manpower policy - No single issue captures the turmoil, difficulties, and chaos within the Russian military as does the manpower policy. Conscription and recruitment tie the military to every stratum of society, and poor morale arising from horrible conditions in military units in turn stimulate public demands for changes. In summary, the main problems are as follows:<sup>244</sup>

- large troop withdrawals from Europe and the Baltic States;
- large armed forces reductions;
- reduction of the term of conscripts to 18 months in February 1993 with a complex new law *On Military Obligation and Military Service*;
- economic crisis;

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., pp. 130-137.

- budget crisis and problems of modern equipment, payment, manpower (especially conscripts), and morale;
- corruption among the senior military because economic realities make competition for personal income among the military elites inevitable for a long time;
- ethnic problems and military involvement and wars in the "near abroad."

(2) Military industrial policy - Another main problem concerning civil-military relations in Russia is the military-industrial sector. Odom and Dujarric summarize the situation as follows :

Both the military industrialists' image of their own capabilities and the military theorists' fantasies about high-technology armed forces and their feasibility suggest that these groups were either out of touch with their own realities or ignorant of what is required to achieve the kind of military-industrial capabilities that exist in the United States. A Russian free market economy could possibly produce them within the next decade or longer, but the old central planning structure could not be revived to achieve them except through forced allocations at the expense of the rest of the economy.<sup>245</sup>

(3) Command, control, and force structure - The formal structure of political institutions at the top of the Russian Federation is prescribed in the new constitution from 12 December 1993. It makes the president the supreme commander of the armed forces, gives him appointive and removal powers over the military *high command* as well as the right to confer military ranks, and requires that he approve military doctrine.<sup>246</sup>

The government, controlling the ministry of defense and other so-called power ministries (ministry of security and ministry of the interior), is the president's implementing arm for his military duties. In the parliament, the Federation Council (e.g., the upper chamber) has jurisdiction over questions of using military force outside the borders of the Russian Federation, and it must examine all laws adopted by the Duma (e.g., lower

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<sup>245</sup> Ibid., pp. 139-140.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., p. 141.

chamber) concerning *questions of war and peace*. This allocation of powers and responsibilities leaves unclear a number of key questions. Presumably the Federation Council is the ultimate parliamentary authority in approving military actions by the president, but the Duma apparently has some role if it can pass laws concerning *questions of war and peace*. More significant may be the lack of clarity in the constitution about the ultimate power of the purse. The president and the government must propose a budget to the Duma, and the Duma may revise it, but because the President can still rule by decree, including decrees on expenditures of state funds, the locus of final fiscal authority remains unclear. Moreover, authority over taxation suffers the same ambiguity. As long as much of the military industrial capacity is controlled by state, and while the private economic sector remains small, the locus of fiscal power for military spending is uncertain.

(4) Chechen War - Perhaps the Chechen War is one of the greatest disasters in Russian military history.<sup>247</sup> There are many reasons for the failure of the Russian armed forces in this war :

- the lack of *lessons learned* from Afghanistan,
- the lack of *battle-readiness*;
- the lack of *equipment and training*;
- the lack of *humanity*;
- the lack of *morale*.

"The belief that *the real rulers of Russia today are the mafia* is as widespread among Russian soldiers as in the society at large."<sup>248</sup> The dominant cliché to be heard on the Chechen side was : "One Chechen is worth a hundred Russians."<sup>249</sup> In contrast, the frequently heard cliché on the Russian side was : "A fish rots from the head."<sup>250</sup> The *head*

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<sup>247</sup> Lieven, Anatol, "Russia's Military Nadir, The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle," The National Interest, 1996, pp. 24-29.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

in this case meant not just Yeltsin, but also Defense Minister Grachev and to an extent the military hierarchy, ridled as it was and is with outrageous corruption and outright theft.

*To recapitulate*, this chapter focused on the Russian foreign and security policy as well as the Russian armed forces in state and society. It is important to keep in mind three main aspects.

(1) Russia still is a very important country in global prospectives, and it seems that Russia will continue to be so at least in the near future. Furthermore, Russia is still a multi-national country with enormous ethnic problems.

(2) But Russia must realize that an imperial Russian foreign and security policy of *Lebensraum* with the intention to restore as much as possible of the former Soviet Union, a more aggressive Russian military doctrine as well as a more offensive military strategy are violations of the *rules of the game* of international peace and humanity. Russia must realize that international support of the process of democratization depends on these *rules of the game* -- peace, democracy, human rights.

(3) The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the Soviet / Russian military with a greater potential for political influence than under the old communist regime. Furthermore, the incentives for the military to exert political influence -- its self-interest -- and opportunities for doing so -- lack of credible civilian institutions -- are not likely to disappear in the near future. The military in Russia is likely to continue to seek political influence and is well positioned to do so. There are, however, considerable limitations on the scope of political power the military is likely to attain. One limitation is that the military, whatever its rhetoric, has proven to be primarily concerned about its corporate interests. The other important limitation is that the Russian military pursues influence within political alliances rather than political power for itself.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?", pp. 64-65.



## VII. CONCLUSION

The study of theory and history brings an understanding about civil-military relations and its problems in the process of democratization. This topic was and still is a very important and sensitive issue in Germany as well as abroad. For example, the Prussian-German General Staff has aroused strong emotions among other nations concerned with Germany and contemporary military affairs during this century and before.

The men in their Prussian blue or field-gray uniforms with the crimson facings have earned such epithets as *brilliant militarists, the brains of armies, geniuses of war, criminals against peace, foes of democracy, and technocrats of organized violence*.<sup>252</sup>

(1) The *first main finding* of this study is that the example of the Weimar Republic underlines the relevance of a successful consolidation of democracy. Democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful transition toward democracy because a viable democracy rather depends on a successful consolidation. After World War I the transition toward democracy was successful. But *Weimar* never was a consolidated democracy, and *Weimar* never solved the problems of civil-military relations.

The failure of the first German democracy opened the way to the Third Reich. After 1933 -- in comparison to the democratic forces of the Weimar Republic -- the *Führer and Reichskanzler* Adolf Hitler and his Nazis were much more successful in consolidating their totalitarian system in Germany. The result was the second German bid for European hegemony -- the catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust.

The total defeat of Germany in World War II and the allied intervention opened the way for the process of democratization in West Germany. With support of the former enemies -- especially the United States -- the Federal Republic of Germany became a consolidated and viable democracy. Democracy became and still is *the only game in town*.

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<sup>252</sup> Donald Abenheim, in Millotat, Christian O.E., Understanding the Prussian - German General Staff System, Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. vii.

Since German unification some observers fear that a unified Germany would quickly take advantage of its new and powerful position in the heart of Europe, discard its strong support for European integration and switch to a unilateral foreign and security policy to further its influence in Europe and in the world.

As East and West Germany undergo the process of unification and sovereignty restrictions disappear, the post-Second World War circumstances that made West Germany an economic giant, but a political dwarf, have changed irrevocably. The transformation of Germany into a well-rounded great power, however, requires more than just quick policy fixes. Germany's past role in international politics is still deeply etched in the memories both of the people of Europe and elsewhere, and of Germany's own policy-makers.<sup>253</sup>

Germany has a specific historical responsibility and shame especially concerning World War II and the Holocaust. Today Germany can look back on the longest period of peace in its recent history, to which the *Bundeswehr*, side by side with the armed forces of our allies, has made a crucial contribution.<sup>254</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany should use any possibility to support the processes of democracy and human rights in the world.

... Germany has greater international responsibility, especially as far as security in and for Europe is concerned. Much is expected of Germany because of its central role, its potential and its history. Germany has learned the lessons of history and will thus continue to pursue a policy of active integration and broad international cooperation.<sup>255</sup>

The concept of *Inner Führung* is a key element of civil-military relations in Germany. Despite all criticism this concept was and still is very successful at least in the

<sup>253</sup> Schlör, Wolfgang F., German Security Policy. An examination of the trends in German security policy in a new European and global context, London : The International Institute for Strategic Studies, ADELPHI Paper 277, 1993, p. 3.

<sup>254</sup> Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in Federal Ministry of Defense (editor), White Paper 1994. White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, Bonn (GE) : Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1994, p. vi.

<sup>255</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 40.

German case. *Innere Führung* was born in a difficult time and proved itself in the old *Bundeswehr* against hard challenges in every decade leading to unification.

(2) This leads to the *second main finding* of this study. *Innere Führung* reflects a permanent process with interdependent relations between state, society, and *Bundeswehr*. It includes the three aspects which should characterize a modern concept of civil-military relations :

- civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.

The German *Bundeswehr* is very proud to be a democratic *and* professional army on the basis of the *Innere Führung* including civilian control / civilian supremacy as well as civil-military cooperation (*Primat der Politik*), integration into state and society (*Staatsbürger in Uniform*), a high responsibility toward democracy (*Politische Bildung - Protector of Democracy*), and high military skills (*Auftragstaktik*).

Today and in future *Innere Führung* faces two great challenges from inside Germany. First, with the warning of the Cold War and the inception of a dangerous and unknown new world, the *Bundeswehr* has to prepare itself for missions outside the traditional framework of NATO. *Missions other than war* are a problem because they could politicise the soldiers in future. Such a politicization would be the opposite of the concept of professionalism. However, *Innere Führung* must solve this challenge successfully. Second, if the *Bundeswehr* does become a *volunteer army*, *Innere Führung* will more than ever have to tie the soldier to his society, because the link of universal military service, which bound the soldier and civil society together, will have been broken.

The era of the conscript army, which began with the French Revolution, would appear to be fading into history. With it, presumably, will go the close identification between citizen and soldier, people and army.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Diamond Larry and Plattner, Marc F. (editors), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 10-11.

The *Bundeswehr* and *Innere Führung* must be able to handle both future challenges -- *missions other than war* and *volunteer armed forces*. Perhaps *Innere Führung* must be prepared to handle both challenges at once.

In addition, there is another great challenge for the concept of *Innere Führung* from outside Germany. *Innere Führung* has become a model for new democracies especially in Eastern Europe, when they consider how to rebuild their armed forces and to solve the problems of civil-military relations in the ongoing process of transition towards and consolidation of democracy.<sup>257</sup> These countries and also Russia have all approached Germany and the *German Bundeswehr* for information about civil-military relations and its key-aspect, *Innere Führung*, in a democracy. They have approached the *Bundeswehr* because of its proximity, historical ties, the success of *Innere Führung* in the German case, and because the *Bundeswehr* is also a conscript army like theirs and has had immediate experience in dealing with a socialist army, the National People's Army -- Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) -- of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), with similar organization, ethos, and problems.

Yet another reason given for the interest in the *Bundeswehr* and *Innere Führung* is the belief that the *Bundeswehr* is an example, perhaps the only example, of an army successfully growing out of totalitarianism and into the service of a democratic society. But this belief is questionable. We have to keep in mind some special circumstances before using the *German Bundeswehr* and *Innere Führung* as a positive example or in comparison to other states.

(3) This leads to the *third main finding* of this study. The German case after the collapse of Nazi Germany is very different concerning transition toward and consolidation of democracy as well as civil-military relations especially in comparison to the case of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

- *Foreign and Security Policy* - Germany's intentions of imperialism, hegemony and *Lebensraum* came to an abrupt end with the total defeat in 1945. After the catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust Germany was divided for 45 years and

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<sup>257</sup> Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 132.

also lost its ambitions to be a *great power* in global prospectives. In contrast, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian foreign policy shifted to the "near abroad" in 1993, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the Russian future military doctrine seems to have become more aggressive. Furthermore, Russia still claims to be a *great power* in global prospectives.

*The only important thing to remember always is that Russia must be treated with respect. Our people will never accept any other language from any state whatsoever.*<sup>258</sup>

- *Transition to Democracy* - In spite of the German history and tradition of democratic and liberal forces and parties as well as the resistance against Hitler and the Nazi regime from inside Germany, the prerequisites for the transition toward and consolidation of democracy in West Germany after World War II came first of all from outside by intervention. The signature of the *unconditional surrender* of the German armed forces on 7 May 1945 was -- in contrast to the end of World War I -- the sign of total defeat. Germany was occupied by the Allied armed forces which were in command and control of every action. The Nazi party (*NSDAP*) was eliminated, and the old totalitarian structures and lines of communication were destroyed. In contrast, in Russia the transition came from inside by transformation. The old post-totalitarian and antidemocratic forces are still alive, and old force structures and lines of communication are still working. The Russian security and intelligence establishment underlines this problem.

Marked continuities between the old Soviet system and the new Russian security and intelligence establishment are to be expected. The MVD (ministry of interior) remains in operation both formally and substantively. Although the KGB has been formally abolished, all the KGB's subparts have survived, some now autonomous, most of them merely relocated.<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> President Boris Yeltsin, Victory Day Speech, 9 May 1994, quoted by Braitwaite, Rodic, "Russian Realities and Western Politics," *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3, 1994, p. 11.

<sup>259</sup> Odom, William E. and Dujarric, Robert, *Commonwealth or Empire ? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus*, Indianapolis; Indiana : Hudson Institute, 1995, p. 145.

- *Consolidation of Democracy* - The process of transition toward and consolidation of democracy in West Germany was under control as well as protection of the Western Allies, the United States, Great Britain, and France. All former armed forces which had supported the Nazi regime directly or indirectly or could be a threat to the process of democratization were eliminated -- *Geheime Staatspolizei (GeStaPo)*, *Schutzstaffel (SS)* and *Waffen SS* as well as the *Wehrmacht* herself. In contrast, in Russia are several important forces still under weapons -- *Border Troops*, *Internal Troops*, *Russian Armed Forces* (Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, Ground Forces), *Civil Defense Troops*, *Railroad Troops* and *Construction Troops*, *Cossacks*. The *August coup* in 1991 and the *October Mutiny* in 1993 underline the problem of command and control in general. The problem of civil-military relations isn't solved until today.

- *Constitutional and Governmental Aspects* - Beside the allied intervention the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 was also a result of democratic traditions and lessons learned from *Weimar*. The state created on the basis of this Basic Law was a state of laws with political parties, basic civil rights, the separation of powers and representative government (*Bundestag*). For example, the Basic Law has no provision for emergency decrees, and the power of the president is limited in general. In contrast, Russia has neither a democratic tradition nor lessons learned from own history concerning democratization.

It is frequently argued -- Russia is a favorite example -- that the absence of democratic traditions impedes the consolidation of new democratic institutions and, conversely, that democracy is more stable in countries ... that have enjoyed it in the past. What this argument misses is that if a country *had* a democratic regime ..., it is a veteran not only of democracy but of the *successful subversion* of democracy. Political learning, in other words, cuts both ways. Democrats may find the work of consolidation easier when they can rely on past traditions, but antidemocratic forces also have an experience from which they can draw lessons : people know that overthrowing democracy is possible, and may even know how to do it.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael, Cheibub, José A. and Limongi, Fernando, "What Makes Democracy Endure ?" Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 1, January 1996, pp. 43-44.

- *Economy and Ethnic Problems* - After World War II West German reconstruction and economic growth were supported by the *Marshall Plan* of the United States. Furthermore, in the process of democratization Germany was not confronted with ethnic problems. In contrast, in Russia the solution of the economic crisis and the ethnic problems are two main sources of conflict in the process of democratization.

- *Armed Forces* - The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany was under control of the Western Allies. The *Bundeswehr* came into existence one decade after the fall of the Third Reich and six years after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Right from the beginning in 1955 the *Bundeswehr* was an armed force in a democratic state. Furthermore, right from the beginning the *Bundeswehr* was a conscript armed force as well as an alliance armed force.

- *Civil-Military Relations* - The problem of civil-military relations was solved in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s, first of all by basic civilian control, e.g., basic law, institutions, a civilian as Minister of Defense, and then -- in addition -- by *Innere Führung*. *Innere Führung* is a result of the specific German history and lessons learned. In contrast, without a consolidated democracy Russia never will be able to control its own armed forces and to establish basic civilian control. This control will be difficult to establish because parliamentary oversight in Russia suffers from two problems : the Duma's historical legacy of weak constitutional authority to review and amend executive decisions, and the ability of the executive to circumvent parliamentary funding prerogatives. "Here, effective civilian control can come only through a fundamental review of existing constitutional provisions."<sup>261</sup>

(4) These differences lead to the *fourth main finding* of this study. Russia should analyse *Innere Führung* with the intention of finding some answers to her own problems of civil-military relations. But Russia must keep in mind the historical context and the specific circumstances of the German *Innere Führung*.

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<sup>261</sup> Bernstein, Alvin H., "Civilian Control of the Military in a Democratic Society," Speech - Executive Level Seminar on Democratic Defense Planning and Budgeting, European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GE), 1996, p. 15.

(5) The analysis of German history leads to the *fifth main finding* of this study. Many conditions for the transition toward and consolidation of democracy in the Weimar Republic are very similar to the situation in Russia today.

- *Crisis of the Foreign and Security Policy* - The old European balance of power was destroyed after World War I. Germany lost power, prestige, and territory. But Germany never quit the ambitions to be a *great power*. The aims of German foreign and security policy was the revision of the Treaty of Versailles by negotiation and conciliation. The old balance of power was also destroyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet Union / Russia lost power, prestige, and territory. And also Russia today still claims to be a great power with aims in the foreign and security policy toward the "near abroad."

- *Constitutional Crisis* - In Russia today the strong position of the President and the Art. 87.-2. of the Russian Constitution are comparable with the position of the President of the Weimar Republic and the famous Art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution (emergency-decree power).

In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or a direct threat or aggression, the President of the Russian Federation may introduce martial law throughout the Russian Federation or in specific localities ....<sup>262</sup>

These aspects may not be a problem in states were democracy is *the only game in town*. In *Weimar* it was a central problem and opened the way to Hitler and Nazi Germany. In Russia these aspects can also become a threat to the process of democratization when the next President is from an extreme right or extreme left party.

- *Governmental Crisis* - The weakness and little willingness on the part of the political parties to compromise led to the permanent malaise in the *Weimar Reichstag* as well as in the *Russian State Duma* today.

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<sup>262</sup> Art. 87. 2. of the Russian Constitution from 1993, quoted from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, "Russia's Parliamentary Elections 1993 and 1995. Includes the text of the 1993 Russian Constitution," Columbus, Ohio, 1996, p. 47.

- *Crisis of the Economy* - Inflation, depression, unemployment, and influx of foreign capital characterized the economy of the *Weimar Republic* as well as Russia's economy today.

- *Crisis of the Armed Forces and Civil-Military Relations* - The *Reichswehr* had lost the Great War and had to handle heavy budget cuts as well as armed forces reductions. Furthermore, several paramilitary groups became a factor in the domestic decision making process of *Weimar*. Also the Soviet / Russian Armed Forces have lost the last wars -- Afghanistan and the Chechen War -- and have to handle heavy budget cuts and armed forces reductions. In addition, also in Russia several armed forces play an important domestic role, e.g., Border Troops, Interior Troops, Cossacks. In *Weimar* and Russia today the problems of command and control as well as civil-military relations are similar.

(6) The analysis of Russian history and present Russia leads to the *sixth main finding* of this thesis. Will the Russian military become involved in politics and seize political power against the process of democratization in future ? It is possible to analyse several scenarios. However, the answers to this question still remain controversial. For example, James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones come to the following conclusion :

There is one scenario in which the military may be the prime architect of political change. If there were complete political paralysis at the center, the high command could initiate a seizure of power to restore order. Alternately, selected regional military commanders might forge a coalition with like-minded provincial leaders, to seize power with the goal of restoring the centralized state. However, a military-initiated seizure of power is likely only if there were a complete collapse of central authority and military leaders and the officer corps became convinced that only intervention by the Armed Forces could prevent Russia's descent into anarchy.<sup>263</sup>

In contrast, Mikhail Tsyplkin argued in 1992 that it seems that the Russian military will not seize power in future to restore order :

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<sup>263</sup> Brusstar, James H. and Jones, Ellen, The Russian Military's Role in Politics, Washington, D.C. : Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 34, 1995, p. 42.

The military in Russian and Soviet history never took power for itself. The Russian/Soviet political elites, however, have generally found it impossible to keep or achieve power without active support from the military because of the country's lack of representative institutions, vast ethnic diversity, and sheer size. ...

Theoretically, if political instability continues unabated, the military might become motivated to break with the tradition and make a bid for undivided power. In reality, however, this is not the most likely scenario because the political process in the Russian society are directly reflected, if not magnified, in the armed forces. Chaos in the society as a whole would only mean further disintegration of the military, whose factions then would align with whatever political forces arise to fill the great vacuum.<sup>264</sup>

(7) *Finally*, this study underlines that Russia's present situation is intricate and unstable in domestic policy as well as in foreign policy. The government seems to be unable to solve the budget crisis, the economic crisis, ethnic problems, and problems of the military. Russia really needs international support to be successful in the process of democratization. But Russia must accept the *rules of the game* -- peace, democracy and human rights. A Russian foreign policy with the intention of restoring the former Soviet Union, a more aggressive Russian military doctrine as well as a more offensive military strategy are violations of these *rules of the game*.

*Russia's grand strategy* in future and the action and reaction of Russia's neighbors as well as NATO and the United States depends on whether Russia will be able to establish a viable democracy like the Federal Republic of Germany or will relapse into authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism or even totalitarianism and a passion for empire-building like Nazi Germany after the failure of the Weimar Republic.

Perhaps one day Russia might even become somehow ordinary, a country of problems rather than catastrophes, a place that develops rather than explodes. That would be something to see.<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Tsyplkin, Mikhail, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1992, p. 44 and pp. 64-65.

<sup>265</sup> Remnick, David, Lenin's Tomb. The Last Days of the Russian Empire, New York : Random House, 1993.

In a world of nuclear weapons a Russian catastrophe could become very fast a regional or even global catastrophe, and a Russian explosion could become a global explosion -- the worst case scenario is World War III. Remember, Germany was defeated and weak after World War I, and the axis powers were satisfied. Germany became a democracy, and there was the dream of a better and more peaceful world because of the lessons learned from Germany and World War I. There was the League of Nations ... and then ... Hitler ... Munich 1938 ... war ... *Holocaust*.



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